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THE  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  UNION
Gil Seinfeld*
ABSTRACT
The primary goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the interest in national unity does
important, independent work in the law of vertical federalism.  We have long been accustomed to
treating union as a constitutionally operative value in cases involving the duties states owe one
another (i.e. horizontal federalism cases), but in cases involving the relationship between the
federal government and the states, the interest in union is routinely ignored.  This Article shows
that, across a wide range of cases relating to the allocation of power between the federal govern-
ment and the states, the states are constrained by a duty to acknowledge their status, and their
citizens’ identities, as members of a political community that is national in scope.  These deci-
sions are conventionally defended (by both courts and commentators) in supremacy-based terms.
But I will show that they are rooted, instead, in an ethic of union.
INTRODUCTION
Union is an important constitutional value.  It is listed first in the Pream-
ble among the aspirations motivating the adoption of the new charter;1 it is
the central value underlying numerous fragments of constitutional text such
as the Full Faith and Credit Clause2 and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause;3 and it is the driving force behind familiar bodies of judge-made law
such as the cases relating to the dormant commerce power.  All of this is
common ground.  Courts and scholarly commentators unhesitatingly
© 2014 Gil Seinfeld.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  I am grateful to Scott
Dodson, Dick Fallon, Daniel Halberstam, Don Herzog, Scott Hershovitz, Leah Litman, Jim
Pfander, and Richard Primus for reading and commenting on earlier drafts and to the
participants in the Legal Theory Workshop at the University of Michigan Law School and
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1 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.”).
2 Id. art. IV, § 1.
3 Id. art. IV, § 2.
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acknowledge that these features of our constitutional architecture are moti-
vated by the interest in union—by which I mean the interest in binding the
several states into a single political community.  They are designed, as one
case put it, “to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sover-
eign States.”4
But judicial and scholarly engagement with the constitutional interest in
union is characterized by a significant blind spot: vertical federalism is largely
ignored.  That is, while we have long been accustomed to treating union as a
constitutionally operative value in cases relating to the duties states owe one
another,5 it has received scant attention where the relationship between the
federal government and the states is at issue.6  This is a mistake.  Union is a
constitutional value with ramifications across both contexts.  It constrains
states not only in their treatment of other states, their citizens, and their laws,
4 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); see also, e.g., Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276–77 (1935) (noting that “[t]he very purpose of the full faith
and credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sover-
eignties . . . and to make them integral parts of a single nation”); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (characterizing the Commerce Clause—the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine in particular—as essential to our “national solidarity”); Daniel
Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV.
731, 789 & n.206 (2004) (identifying these clauses as examples of “individual provisions of
the U.S. Constitution [that] suggest specific duties of mutual cooperation and respect,
especially among the states and for the Union”); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1507–08 (2007) (“It is . . . clear that the Framers
intended [Article IV], especially Sections 1 and 2, to help forge the states into a closer
union.”); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1113 (1986) (arguing that a prohibition
on purposeful economic protectionism lies at the core of dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence and that such protectionism is objectionable because “it is inconsistent with the
very idea of political union”).  The Extradition and Fugitive Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2, are also commonly understood as union-reinforcing devices. See Halberstam, supra, at
789 & n.206; Metzger, supra, at 1507.
5 The Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine constrain states in their interactions with one another,
with other states’ citizens, and other states’ laws.
6 An important exception is Halberstam, supra note 4.  Professor Halberstam finds R
traces of a jurisprudence of “fidelity” in the law of American federalism. Id. at 789–817.
This principle of fidelity (which, he explains, figures more prominently in both the Ger-
man federal system and in the European Union, see id. at 739–89) “insists that each level or
unit of a government must always act to ensure the proper functioning of the system of
governance as a whole.” Id. at 734.  In describing the German incarnation of fidelity,
Halberstam explains that it commands “an attitude conducive to a union,” id. at 745 (quot-
ing Rudolf Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungrecht, reprinted in STAATSRECHTLICHE ABHAN-
DLUNGEN 119, 271 (2d ed. 1968)), and that it is focused on “group formation, association,
and the formation of a particular common political attitude within parliament and among
the citizenry sharing this experience.” Id. at 748 (quoting Smend, supra, at 154).  The
concept of union that I find lurking beneath the surface of different pockets of the law of
vertical federalism, see infra Section I.C. and Part II, is similar to the idea of fidelity that
Halberstam is working with.  In particular, political association and the fostering of “a com-
mon political attitude” feature prominently in my account as well as his.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 3 10-FEB-14 13:39
2014] the  jurisprudence  of  union 1087
but in their orientation toward the national government and federal law as
well.
Part of the reason for our collective inattention to the constitutional
interest in union is our tendency, in vertical federalism cases, to focus exclu-
sively on the tug of war between the values of national supremacy and state
autonomy.  Seen through this prism, the central challenge in a vertical feder-
alism case is to strike the proper balance between these fundamental goals,
typically by deciding which must give way to the other.  In many contexts, this
is an entirely sensible way to approach problems of vertical federalism.  The
values of national supremacy and state autonomy are enshrined in the Con-
stitution’s text.7  Careful consideration of each, and their relationship to one
another, is essential to clear thinking about a host of issues in the law of
federal-state relations, including the scope of federal legislative power under
the Commerce Clause, Congress’s authority to regulate states in connection
with traditional government functions, and the scope of states’ immunity
from damages actions arising under federal law.  But it is not always so.
Sometimes, if we want to get a handle on what’s at stake in a vertical federal-
ism case, it is necessary to consult the constitutional interest in union.8
The primary goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the constitutional
interest in union does important, independent work in vertical federalism
cases.  I will show, in particular, that across a wide range of cases relating to
the allocation of power between the federal government and the states, the
states are constrained by a duty to acknowledge their status, and their citi-
zens’ identities, as members of a political community that is national in
scope.  These decisions, we will see, are conventionally defended in
supremacy-based terms.  But in fact they are driven by an ethic of union.
Shifting to a union-based understanding of these pockets of case law has
three principal virtues.  First, and most narrowly, union supplies a more per-
suasive analytic foundation for the Court’s decisions in these areas than the
standard supremacy-based accounts.  The cases in question are rightly
decided, but you could be forgiven for having doubts after reading the Jus-
tices’ opinions.  Second, greater attention to union’s role across these bodies
of case law affords us a clearer picture of the structure of our Constitution.  It
reveals that supremacy is not the only constitutional value doing nationalist
work in our federal system, and that union’s influence on the shape of our
federalism is not limited to matters of interstate relations.  Finally, a union-
based approach allows us to better understand the character of the legal
rules established in these cases.  In particular, it calls attention to the fact that
7 This is straightforwardly true of national supremacy. See U.S. CONST. art VI.  That
state autonomy qualifies as a fundamental constitutional value is reflected—less explicitly,
but still quite clearly—in the Tenth Amendment and in the Framers’ decision to enumer-
ate the powers of the national government. See id. amend. X.
8 As I explain later, the union-oriented rules I explore in this Article are not unre-
lated to the interest in national supremacy. See infra subsection I.B.2.  But they operate
differently from the garden-variety, preemption style constraints on state autonomy that
are typically associated with that interest.
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the rules in question are concerned with the expressive significance of the
law.  They are concerned, in other words, not with the direct material conse-
quences of the state statutes under review, but with the fact that those statutes
send the wrong message about the relationship between the national govern-
ment and the states.  Supremacy-based analysis obscures this point entirely.
This last point is of particular interest because, while expressivist
approaches to constitutional rules pertaining to individual rights have
received a great deal of scholarly attention,9 academic commentary explor-
ing expressivism and federalism is in relatively short supply.10  And while a
small number of scholars have joined issue on the question of whether federal
law might be unconstitutional because it expresses the wrong view of state
sovereignty or state autonomy,11 the relevant commentary generally neglects
the possibility that state law might be constitutionally infirm because it
expresses the wrong view of the national government, federal law, or our
union.12  But there is no reason to think that arguments about expressivism
and federalism should run in one direction only and, indeed, the cluster of
cases I explore here supports exactly this point.  To see this, however, one
must look beyond the supremacy frame that so dominates the Justices’ opin-
ions and the attendant academic commentary.
My analysis proceeds in three parts.  Part I lays the foundation for my
claim that the constitutional interest in union does important work in vertical
federalism cases.  It does so through a detailed analysis of the Supreme
9 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1533–45 (2000) (developing an expressivist
account of equal protection doctrine); id. at 1545–51 (Establishment Clause); Deborah
Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13–43 (2000)
(Equal Protection Clause); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme
Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986) (Establishment Clause).
10 Exceptions include Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-
Commandeering Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1316–47 (2000) (offering an expressivist
defense of the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-
hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003) (examining the law of state sovereign immunity—in particular,
its recent focus on the dignity of states as sovereign entities—through an expressivist lens);
and Anderson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 1556–64 (exploring expressivist accounts of the R
Rehnquist Court’s anti-commandeering and sovereign immunity decisions).  For skeptical
consideration of expressivist accounts of federalism doctrine, see Matthew D. Adler & Seth
F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV.
71, 133–42.
11 See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 1556–64; Cox, supra note 10, at 1348. R
12 The important exception is Anderson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 1554 (arguing that R
the Supreme Court’s dormant commerce doctrine is rooted in the notion that “protection-
ist legislation expresses a constitutionally impermissible attitude toward the interests of
other States in the political union”).  While Anderson and Pildes contemplate the possibil-
ity that state laws might be unconstitutional because they express the wrong view of our
union, they do so only in connection with their discussion of horizontal federalism. Id. at
1554–55.  They do not entertain the possibility that a state law might be constitutionally
infirm because it expresses the wrong view of our national government and of states’ and
citizens’ relationship to it.
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Court’s “valid excuse” decisions—the line of cases relating to the constitu-
tional limits on state courts’ authority to decline jurisdiction over federal
causes of action.  I will show that the interest in national supremacy has
emerged as the dominant theme in these cases—especially in the Supreme
Court’s 2009 decision in Haywood v. Drown,13 which represents the most
recent installment in this line—and that the interest in union has received
only superficial attention.  I then argue that the supremacy-based rationale
relied upon by the Court supplies an inadequate foundation for the con-
straints on state autonomy recognized by the Justices, and I attempt to
demonstrate that the cases are better understood by reference to the consti-
tutional interest in union.
Part II situates the valid excuse cases within a broader constitutional
framework.  It examines Supreme Court decisions from the disparate fields
of intergovernmental tax immunity, foreign affairs, and voting rights to help
build the case that Haywood and its forebears are part of a wide-ranging juris-
prudence of union.  Here too, we will see that judges and commentators tend
to favor supremacy-based accounts of the relevant legal rules, and here too
we will see that these accounts are wanting.
In Part III, finally, I attempt to deepen our understanding of the juris-
prudence of union.  I do this, first, by demonstrating that the constraints on
state autonomy explored in this Article are best understood in expressivist
terms.  Next, I test the constitutional bona fides of the jurisprudence of
union by considering its fit with constitutional text, history, structure, and
precedent, and by assessing whether the union-based constraints on state
autonomy tend to advance or undermine the functional values typically asso-
ciated with our federal system.  I conclude with a brief assessment of how the
jurisprudence of union might apply in contexts not yet considered by the
courts.
I. STATE JURISDICTIONAL AUTONOMY, FEDERAL SUPREMACY, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN UNION
A. The Haywood Decision
Haywood v. Drown involved two § 1983 actions filed in New York state
court by a prison inmate against employees of New York’s Department of
Corrections.  The plaintiff, Keith Haywood, alleged violations of his civil
rights in connection with three prison disciplinary proceedings and an alter-
cation with corrections officers.14  The trial court dismissed the actions on
the ground that section 24 of the New York Correction Law prohibited the
exercise of jurisdiction.  Section 24 provided that New York courts cannot
hear suits for damages filed by prison inmates against corrections officers for
actions taken in the scope of their employment.15  Plaintiffs who wish to file
13 556 U.S. 729 (2009).
14 Id. at 731–32.
15 N.Y. CORRECTION LAW § 24 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2012).
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such actions are required, instead, to substitute the State of New York as
defendant and to seek relief in the New York Court of Claims.16  A panel of
the New York Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, as did
the New York Court of Appeals.17
A line of cases stretching back to the early twentieth century establishes
that while state courts are generally competent to entertain federal claims
and presumptively enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over federal causes of
action, they may refuse to adjudicate a federal claim so long as they have a
“valid excuse” for doing so.18  The central question at issue in Haywood was
whether section 24—and the policy underlying it—qualified as a constitu-
tionally valid excuse.  If it did not, the dismissal of Haywood’s § 1983 claims
would be impermissible under the Supremacy Clause.
In answering this question in the affirmative, the New York Court of
Appeals focused its attention on the fact that section 24 applied evenhand-
edly to state and federal causes of action.  The statute, in other words, pro-
hibited prison inmates from bringing damages actions against corrections
officers regardless of whether their claims sounded in state or federal law.19
According to the Court of Appeals, this sufficed to insulate New York’s juris-
dictional scheme from Supremacy Clause attack.  “[A] state rule will be
deemed . . . ‘valid,’” the court explained,
if it does not discriminate against federal claims in favor of analogous state
claims. . . . [I]f the same type of claim, arising under state law, would be
enforced in the state courts, the state courts are generally not free to refuse
enforcement of the federal claim. . . .
. . . [B]ut if the state does not hear a particular state claim, it may also
decline to consider related federal causes of action in its state courts.20
Because section 24 did not distinguish between § 1983 claims and analogous
causes of action created by state law, the Court of Appeals determined that
New York’s jurisdictional scheme was constitutionally sound.21
16 See id.  The New York Court of Claims is a markedly less favorable forum for plain-
tiffs. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 734 (“[P]laintiffs in the Court of Claims must comply with a
90-day notice requirement, are not entitled to a jury trial, have no right to attorney’s fees,
and may not seek punitive damages or injunctive relief.” (citations omitted)).
17 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 732.
18 The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the presumption of state court compe-
tence to adjudicate federal claims as early as 1876. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130,
136–37 (1876).  The Court first acknowledged the “valid excuse” doctrine in those particu-
lar terms in Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929).
The principle underlying the doctrine is traceable to Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad (Second Employers’ Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 59 (1911).
19 Haywood v. Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180, 185 (N.Y. 2007) (noting that section 24 “applies
with equal force to all state and federal claims”), rev’d, 556 U.S. 729.
20 Id. at 184 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Id. at 185.  The Court of Appeals was not alone in its understanding that the rele-
vant Supreme Court precedents established a simple nondiscrimination requirement. See,
e.g., Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 791 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming
the dismissal of a federal claim and emphasizing that “Illinois does not discriminat[e]
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The Supreme Court’s valid excuse cases do, indeed, draw attention to
the question of whether state jurisdictional rules apply evenhandedly to state
and federal claims.22  In fact, every one of the pertinent Supreme Court deci-
sions leading up to Haywood can be sorted by reference to the question of
anti-federal discrimination: state court dismissals of federal causes of action
under discriminatory jurisdictional schemes have uniformly been reversed,
while dismissals triggered by evenhanded jurisdictional rules have all been
affirmed.23  At the same time, however, language in the relevant precedents
suggests that the valid excuse doctrine is about more than discrimination
alone.  In particular, the cases intermittently maintain that states cannot strip
their courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate federal causes of action simply
because they disagree with the policy underlying federal law.24  Crucially,
Haywood argued that New York’s legislature enacted section 24 for precisely
this sort of reason (i.e., because it disagreed with federal policy pertaining to
damages actions against corrections officers),25 and the state did not put up
against federal causes of action; its courts do not adjudicate claims of discrimination aris-
ing from state law, either” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a
Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69
VA. L. REV. 819, 838 (1983) (“States may refuse to adjudicate federal claims when the
jurisdictional restriction applies neutrally to exclude claims based on state laws as well.”).
22 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 123
(1945); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233–34 (1934).
23 Compare Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 382–83 (1990) (reversing state court dismis-
sal of federal claims where the dismissal was pursuant to a discriminatory jurisdictional
scheme), Testa, 330 U.S. at 394 (same), McKnett, 292 U.S. at 233–34 (same), and Mondou,
223 U.S. at 59 (same), with Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950) (remand-
ing so that the state court might reconsider its denial of a motion to dismiss a federal claim
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in light of the Court’s clarification that such
dismissal is permitted so long as the doctrine is evenhandedly applied), Herb, 324 U.S. at
128 (affirming state court dismissal of federal causes of action where the dismissal was
pursuant to a jurisdictional scheme that was evenhanded in its treatment of federal
claims), and Douglas, 279 U.S. at 387–88 (same).
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), is something of an exception.  In that case, the
Court reversed the dismissal of a § 1983 action from the Wisconsin courts even though the
dismissal was pursuant to a state notice-of-claim statute that applied with equal force to
state and federal causes of action. See id. at 160 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
that the statue under review “applies to all actions against municipal defendants, whether
brought under state or federal law”).  But the question at issue in Felder is somewhat differ-
ent from the one at issue in the Haywood line of cases. Felder involved a procedural require-
ment that the state courts wished to apply to § 1983 actions that fell within their
jurisdiction.  And the question before the Court, ultimately, was whether the relevant pro-
cedural rule was inconsistent with the remedial purposes of § 1983. Haywood-type cases
present the distinct (though related) question whether states can altogether exclude par-
ticular federal causes of action from their courts’ jurisdiction.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 58–61. R
25 See Brief for Petitioner at 18, Haywood, 556 U.S. 729 (No. 07-10374), 2008 WL
3851618.
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much of a fight along this dimension.26  Hence, the outcome in Haywood
would turn on which conception of the valid excuse doctrine the Supreme
Court endorsed.  If the Court determined that state-federal neutrality alone
suffices to establish the constitutionality of state jurisdictional rules (for
Supremacy Clause purposes, at least), then section 24 would pass constitu-
tional muster; if the Court held that jurisdictional rules—even neutral
ones—cannot be predicated on state disagreement with federal policy, then
the application of section 24 to Haywood’s claims would be constitutionally
impermissible.
The Court endorsed the latter view.  Writing for a bare majority, Justice
Stevens explained that “a State cannot simply refuse to entertain a federal
claim based on a policy disagreement,” and he emphasized that “equality of
treatment does not ensure that a state law will be deemed a . . . valid excuse
for refusing to entertain a federal cause of action.”27  “Although the absence
of discrimination is necessary to our finding a state law neutral,” the Court
held, “it is not sufficient.”28
The Justices’ account of why this is so and, as a corollary, of why section
24 is constitutionally infirm, wavers somewhat erratically between two distinct
(but, in the Court’s view, related) lines of reasoning.  First, the Court echoed
the discussions from prior cases signaling that disagreement with federal pol-
icy cannot supply the predicate for the dismissal of a federal cause of action
from state court.29  The majority credited Haywood’s claim that the enact-
ment of section 24 was motivated by hostility to damages actions against cor-
rections officers,30 and it highlighted the tension between this policy and the
one embodied in § 1983, which invites damages actions against any state offi-
cial—including a corrections officer—who is accused of violating federal
rights.31
26 Though the defendants insisted that New York’s jurisdictional policy was not moti-
vated by hostility to the covered claims, they conceded that it was driven by the belief that
damages actions filed by prisoners against corrections officers “are numerous and often
frivolous.”  Brief for Respondents at 18, Haywood, 556 U.S. 729 (No. 07-10374), 2008 WL
4441076.
27 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 737–38.
28 Id. at 739.
29 Id. at 736 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990) and Mondou v. N.Y, New
Haven & Hartford R.R. (Second Employers’ Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1911)).
30 Id. at 733 & n.3, 736, 739, 742.  The Court buttressed its claim that section 24 was
motivated by disagreement with federal policy by emphasizing that New York’s trial courts
of general jurisdiction routinely adjudicate claims analogous to those covered by section
24.  In particular, those courts are free to entertain damages actions under § 1983 against
government officials other than corrections officers and can even adjudicate § 1983 suits
against corrections officers for relief other than damages. Id. at 739–40.  This militated
against the conclusion that section 24 was an innocuous effort to allocate cases across
courts based on the different tribunals’ subject matter competence and contributed to the
impression that the statute was an exercise in resistance to federal policy. Id. at 741 (“[W]e
find little concerning ‘power over the person and competence over the subject matter’ in
Correction Law § 24.” (quoting Howlett, 496 U.S. at 381)).
31 See id. at 736–37.
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Second, the Court took pains to emphasize that the dismissal of a federal
cause of action from state court, even under an evenhanded jurisdictional
rule, might do violence to federal law and policy.  Thus, the Court main-
tained that the jurisdiction-based dismissal of a federal cause of action from
state court might “undermine federal law,”32 “thwart [the] enforcement” of a
federal claim,33 “burden . . . a federal cause of action,”34 or “nullify a federal
right.”35  The Justices insisted, in the same vein, that Correction Law section
24 was “effectively an immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb”—
which is to say that the rule in question was a thinly veiled effort to quash the
covered claims entirely, not an exercise in judicial housekeeping.36  Of
course, the Supremacy Clause forbids states from immunizing defendants
from liability under federal law;37 and it forbids them, more generally, from
nullifying or thwarting the enforcement of federal rights.  Hence, the appli-
cation of section 24 to defeat Haywood’s § 1983 actions was deemed uncon-
stitutional, and the dismissal of his claims was reversed.
B. Understanding the Doctrine of Valid Excuse: Supremacy?
The Haywood Court deployed two rationales to justify its decision, and it
is important to distinguish between them.  The Court’s first contention—that
mere disagreement with federal policy does not supply a legitimate basis for a
state court’s refusal to adjudicate a federal claim—provides a helpful way of
understanding what is constitutionally troubling about statutes like Correc-
tion Law section 24.  When a state uses its jurisdictional law to express disa-
greement with federal policy, it refuses to take ownership of and
responsibility for the norms endorsed by the nation.  This is an affront to the
constitutional value of union.
I will focus my attention on union later in this Part and in Parts II and
III.  For now, however, I wish only to emphasize that neither Haywood nor its
predecessor cases focuses attention on this constitutional value.  Indeed,
aside from the occasional gesture in the direction of the Supremacy Clause,
the valid excuse cases do virtually nothing to explain what constitutional val-
ues are threatened by state courts’ refusal to exercise jurisdiction over federal
claims or, more generally, by states’ expression of disagreement with federal
policy.  The interest in union, in particular, barely makes its way to the sur-
face of the Court’s analysis in these cases, and it never receives sustained
attention.  Thus, Haywood and its forebears tell us what the states cannot do
when it comes to refusing jurisdiction over federal causes of action, but they
32 Id. at 739.
33 Id. at 741 n.8.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 736.
36 Id. at 742; see also id. at 736 n.5 (“In many respects, Correction Law § 24 operates
more as an immunity-from-damages provision than as a jurisdictional rule.”).
37 Id. at 737 n.5 (noting that a “State’s decision to extend immunity ‘over and above
[that which is] already provided in § 1983 . . . directly violates federal law’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990))).
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never successfully explain why the states cannot do these things.  As I explain
below, this has caused confusion as to the nature of the constitutional defects
that inhere in statutes like section 24, and it impedes efforts to understand
how the Haywood line of decisions fits into the broader mosaic of U.S. consti-
tutional law.
Before I address these (missing) features of the Court’s analysis in the
valid excuse cases, however, I want to examine the second set of justifications
put forward by the Court in Haywood—namely that state court jurisdictional
dismissals carry the capacity to “nullify” or “undermine” federal claims, to
“burden” federal causes of action, or to “thwart” the enforcement of federal
law.  This line of reasoning is of interest for two reasons.  First, these charac-
terizations of the effect on federal law of state court jurisdictional dismissals
are, at best, significantly overstated; at worst, they are just plain wrong.  If the
doctrine articulated in Haywood is to be defended, this is not the way to do it.
Second, these claims provide a clear example of the sort of confusion that is
encouraged by the Court’s half-hearted attention to the constitutional values
underlying the rules it has crafted in this area.  Had the Court seriously
engaged the question of why, exactly, state expressions of disagreement with
federal policy are constitutionally troubling, it might have avoided these
wrongheaded claims about the consequences of jurisdiction-based dismissals
from state court.
1. Nullification of Federal Law and Related Imaginary Problems
Though the majority opinion in Haywood expresses serious concern
about the threat to federal law that is posed by the jurisdiction-based dismis-
sal of federal causes of action from state court, it tells us little about the pre-
cise mechanics of this threat.  In particular, the opinion does not explain how
section 24 served to “undermine”38 (or “nullify” or “thwart” or “burden”)
§ 1983 claims; it does not explain why section 24 is properly regarded as “an
immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb;”39 and—perhaps most tell-
ing—it does not respond to the insistent claims in Justice Thomas’s dissent-
ing opinion that section 24 did none of these things and in fact did not
function like an immunity statute.
As Justice Thomas emphasized, jurisdictional statutes operate differently
from other kinds of legal rules that might trigger the dismissal of a claim
from a particular tribunal.  “A jurisdictional statute,” he explained, “simply
deprives the relevant court of the power to decide the case altogether[,
and] . . . operates without prejudice to the adjudication of the matter in a
competent forum.”40  Thus, the dismissal of Haywood’s § 1983 claims from
the New York courts posed no obstacle to his re-filing the very same claims in
38 Id. at 739.
39 Id. at 742.
40 Id. at 769 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 766 (“Therefore,
even if every state court closed its doors to § 1983 plaintiffs, the plaintiffs could proceed
with their claims in a federal forum.”).
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the federal system.  And New York’s jurisdictional law would of course have
no effect whatever on his capacity to secure relief there.  This is important
because it makes some of the central claims advanced in the majority opinion
rather difficult to defend.  In particular, it is not clear how a federal cause of
action is “undermined”—and it is certainly not nullified—by a rule that
requires the plaintiff to walk across the street to the federal courthouse and
file it there.  As the dissenters argued: “Jurisdictional statutes . . . by definition
are incapable of undermining federal law. . . . The sole consequence of [a]
jurisdictional barrier is that the law cannot be enforced in one particular
judicial forum.”41
I don’t think the Haywood Court meant to suggest that section 24 under-
mined federal law in the sense that (a) the exercise of state court jurisdiction
over § 1983 claims is mandated by § 1983 itself, and so (b) the federal direc-
tive undermined by section 24 is a jurisdictional one.42  Nothing in the text of
the Haywood decision suggests that what section 24 threatened to undermine
or nullify was federal jurisdictional policy.  Rather, the most natural reading
of the majority opinion is that by closing the doors of the state courthouse to
the covered claims, section 24 threatened the central substantive aim of
§ 1983 (i.e., assuring that relief could be had for constitutional violations by
state officials).43
Another possibility—perhaps captured by the Court’s suggestion that
section 24 threatened to “burden” § 1983 claims44—is that the Justices were
concerned that a state court’s refusal to adjudicate a federal cause of action
would make recovery less convenient or more uncertain for plaintiffs.  The
elimination of state court jurisdiction over a federal cause of action will com-
pel some litigants to travel a greater distance to secure relief.  (Sometimes
41 Id. at 769.  The analysis here presumes the availability of federal courts with statu-
tory jurisdiction over the claims in question.  If lower federal courts were not available to
hear the relevant claims, the constitutional analysis might look different. See Robert N.
Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures
from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1585 (1986).
42 As Justice Thomas emphasized, and the majority did not dispute, § 1983 does not
explicitly require state courts to accept jurisdiction over the cause of action it creates. See
Haywood, 556 U.S. at 765 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see Martin H. Redish & John E.
Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311, 347
(1976) (arguing that when Congress establishes concurrent state-federal jurisdiction over a
federal cause of action “presumably Congress . . . has decided that the substantive policies
embodied in the federal statute creating the cause of action and the federal policies con-
cerning the administration of the federal court system are best advanced by distributing
the case burden between the state and federal courts”).
43 This is reflected, for example, in the Court’s contention that section 24 “operates
more as an immunity-from-damages provision than as a jurisdictional rule,” and its observa-
tion that “[t]he State cannot condition its enforcement of federal law on the demand that
those individuals whose conduct federal law seeks to regulate must nevertheless escape
liability.” Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736 n.5, 737.
44 Id. at 741 n.8.
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the federal courthouse is in fact not across the street.)45  And some litigants
may prefer the state jury pool to the federal.46  From the perspective of these
claimants, litigating in federal court might well be “burdensome,” and per-
haps the Court meant to intimate that the imposition of these burdens is
constitutionally problematic in its own right and tantamount to the “nullifica-
tion” or “undermining” of the underlying claims.
Setting aside the question of whether the existence of such impediments
to relief means that a cause of action has been nullified, this line of reasoning
finds no support in the text of Haywood itself.  The majority opinion makes
no mention of convenience to litigants, jury pool issues, or similar considera-
tions.  Nor, for that matter, do any of Haywood’s predecessor cases mention
these sorts of concerns.47
Meanwhile, the Court’s assertion that section 24 “is effectively an immu-
nity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb” is simply untrue.  A rule conferring
bona fide immunity on a particular class of defendant would trigger dismissal
with prejudice and therefore would pose an obstacle to the ultimate vindica-
tion of any claim to which it applied.48  As the dissenting Justices in Haywood
emphasized, however, section 24 genuinely operated jurisdictionally49 (i.e., it
led to dismissal without prejudice), and so it is difficult to understand why the
Court characterized that statute as a species of immunity rule.
What, then, are we to make of the majority’s insistence that states “lack
authority to nullify a federal right,”50 or its claim that a state cannot “thwart
[the] enforcement”51 of federal law?  These seem to be uncontroversially
accurate accounts of the law, but they lack resolving power on the facts of a
case like Haywood where the state statute at issue did neither of these things.
To some extent, these components of the Court’s analysis can probably
be chalked up to careless hyperbole.  Section 24 triggered the dismissal of
federal claims from state court; the statute evinces hostility to a subset of
§ 1983 actions; and it suggests a rather cavalier attitude on New York’s part
45 See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1027 (1995) (“Congress’s
primary objective in securing state court enforcement of federal law is probably to assure
the availability of a convenient judicial forum without having to create a vast army of geo-
graphically dispersed federal courts.”).
46 See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988) (“Litigants who choose to bring
their civil rights actions in state courts presumably do so in order to obtain the benefit of
certain procedural advantages in those courts, or to draw their juries from urban
populations.”).
47 Indeed, in Howlett, the Court expressly disclaimed the notion that these sorts of
considerations drive the requirement that state courts adjudicate federal claims.  Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990).
48 See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 537 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming the
dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim on the ground that defendant was pro-
tected by a state-created immunity), rev’d, 496 U.S. 356.
49 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 772 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 736 (majority opinion).
51 Id. at 741 n.8.
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toward federal law and policy.  It seems fair to say that there is something
unsettling about section 24’s orientation toward federal law, and the over-
heated rhetoric in Haywood might be just a blunderbuss way of communicat-
ing as much.
But something more is going on here, I think.  For at some level, the
Court’s confused foray into the rhetoric of nullification and undermining
was entirely predictable.  Those terms reflect the dominant mode of concep-
tualizing matters of federal supremacy in our legal culture.  And so, once the
Court determined that state courts’ refusal of jurisdiction over federal causes
of action implicates the interest in supremacy—and the doctrine of valid
excuse has been grounded squarely in the Supremacy Clause at least since
the 1947 decision in Testa v. Katt52—reliance on the discourse of nullifica-
tion and undermining followed naturally.
As I explain in the subsection that follows, the Court’s decision to frame
these cases in supremacy-based terms is understandable.  When states close
their courthouse doors to federal causes of action because of disagreement
with the policy embodied in federal law, it makes sense to say that federal
supremacy is under threat.  But it is not threatened in the same way that it is
in garden variety, preemption-style Supremacy Clause cases, and the line of
decisions leading up to and including Haywood is inattentive to this point.
The overclaiming that characterizes the decision in Haywood is both a
byproduct, and an example, of this error.
2. Disagreement with Federal Policy and the Interest in Federal
Supremacy
Before embarking on its misguided detour into the stuff of nullification
and undermining, the Haywood Court stated that Correction Law section 24
violated the Supremacy Clause because it constituted a rejection of federal
policy pertaining to the liability of government officials.  Justice Stevens
explained:
In passing Correction Law § 24, New York made the judgment that correc-
tion officers should not be burdened with suits for damages arising out of
conduct performed in the scope of their employment. . . . The State’s policy,
whatever its merits, is contrary to Congress’ judgment that all persons who
violate federal rights while acting under color of state law shall be held liable
for damages.53
New York, the Court held, could not simply jettison federal policy in favor of
its own and craft its jurisdictional rules accordingly.54
This line of reasoning has two significant virtues.  First, in sharp contrast
to the Court’s battery of claims about section 24 undermining Haywood’s
§ 1983 actions, thwarting the enforcement of federal law, and so on, its con-
tention that New York’s jurisdictional law reflected disagreement with federal
52 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
53 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736–37.
54 Id. at 736.
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policy is unassailable.  As the majority emphasized, New York’s jurisdictional
rule was premised on the notion that damages actions against corrections
officers are “by and large frivolous and vexatious.”55  Quite obviously, § 1983
endorses a different view, and so the tension between the relevant state and
federal policies is patent.56
Second, the central legal claim advanced in this part of the Court’s opin-
ion has deep roots in the precedent case law.  As noted earlier,57 the Court
has long insisted that states cannot refuse to adjudicate a federal claim simply
because they regard it as bad policy.  Thus, in Second Employers’ Liability Cases,
the Court rejected the notion that a state tribunal might decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a federal claim on the ground that “the Act of Congress is
not in harmony with the policy of the State.”58  And in Testa v. Katt, the
Court explained that “a state cannot ‘refuse to enforce [a] right arising from
the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of
wisdom on the part of Congress.’”59  Finally, in Howlett v. Rose, the Court
held that “[t]he Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate them-
selves from federal law because of disagreement with its content.”60  So when
the Haywood Court held that “New York is not at liberty to shut the court-
house door to federal claims that it considers at odds with its local policy,”61
it was standing on firm precedential ground.
What is frustrating about this part of the analysis in Haywood, however, is
the Court’s failure to give sustained attention to the question of what consti-
tutional values lay behind this particular constraint on state judicial auton-
omy.  It is clear that the Justices regarded the Supremacy Clause as the
55 Id. at 733.
56 The dissenting Justices in Haywood resisted the suggestion that section 24 was an
expression of disagreement with the policy embodied in § 1983.  Specifically, Justice
Thomas insisted that “[t]he New York courts . . . have not declared a ‘category’ of § 1983
claims to be ‘frivolous’ or to have ‘no merit’ . . . .  These courts have simply recognized that
they lack the power to adjudicate this category of claims regardless of their merit.” Id. at
772 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  This claim is baffling.  It is true that a particular court’s
reliance on section 24 to justify the dismissal of a § 1983 action would amount to nothing
more than recognition of the statutory limits on its authority.  And so it is accurate to say,
as the dissenters did, that the New York courts “have not declared a ‘category’ of § 1983
claims to be ‘frivolous.’” Id.  But the question remains why those courts lacked authority to
adjudicate the claims in question, and the answer is: “because the state legislature decided
they are likely to be frivolous.”  Notably, the dissenters did not contest the majority’s
claim—and given the record, how could they?—that this was the reason for the enactment
of section 24. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  The dissenters’ argument on this R
point thus misses the mark by a wide margin.
57 See supra text accompanying note 24. R
58 Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. (Second Employers’ Liability Cases),
223 U.S. 1, 57 (1911).
59 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916)).
60 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990).
61 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740.
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operative constitutional text,62 and it is evident that the Court was concerned
with the subordination of congressional policy to the policy of the state of
New York.63  But this kind of subordination is different from the threatened
trumping of federal law that is at issue in conventional, preemption-style
Supremacy Clause cases.  And while it is easy to see what constitutional value
is on the chopping block in a standard preemption case—national law would
not be “supreme,” in any meaningful sense, and the achievement of legiti-
mate federal objectives might be seriously hampered if state law could con-
clusively prevent the vindication of federal claims—the same cannot be said
where limitations on state court jurisdiction are at issue.  The Haywood Court
ignored this distinction entirely.  As a result, the Court’s occasional refer-
ences to the value of supremacy do little to clarify what is at stake in cases of
this sort.
To be clear, I do not mean to resist the notion that the constitutional
value threatened by jurisdictional rules such as Correction Law section 24
can sensibly be labeled “supremacy.”  Any subordination of federal policy to
that of a state stands in tension with the notion that federal law is “supreme.”
And this is true even if the tension is relatively weak because the subordina-
tion takes the form of a rule that does not impede the ultimate vindication of
federal claims or the enforcement of federal law.  But the Haywood Court
gave no indication that this entailment of federal supremacy is distinct from
the trumping function of federal law, nor did it explain why the particular
breed of supremacy marked by Article VI should be understood to prohibit
this comparatively mild exercise in subordination.  Once we set aside the nul-
lification/undermining distraction, then, we are left to wonder what is at
stake, from a constitutional perspective, when state courts refuse jurisdiction
over federal claims.
C. The Law of the Land and the Constitutional Interest in Union
It is possible to find in Haywood and its forebears faint signals that the
doctrine of valid excuse is motivated by something other than classic
supremacy concerns (i.e., something other than concern that the national
government supply the binding legal rule in the face of state law to the con-
trary).  In particular, the cases intermittently suggest that the relevant consti-
tutional constraints on state jurisdictional autonomy are best understood by
reference to the interest in union—the interest in binding the individual
states and their citizens into a cohesive, national political community.  When
state courts discriminate against federal claims, or refuse jurisdiction over
federal causes of action on grounds of policy disagreement, they treat federal
law and policy as exogenous forces—as the impositions of an outsider politi-
cal community.  This is forbidden not because it is tantamount to the nullifi-
cation of federal law, but because it is corrosive to the sense of union that our
Constitution seeks to foster.
62 See, e.g., id. at 731.
63 Id. at 736–37.
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Thus, at the very outset of its discussion, the Haywood Court explained:
“[We have] long made clear that federal law is as much the law of the several
States as are the laws passed by their legislatures.  Federal and state law
‘together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the
land for the State.’”64  This passage is of interest because it suggests not that
federal law trumps state law (which is the central concern of traditional
supremacy analysis), but that, in a sense, federal law is state law.  From this
perspective, the threat posed by jurisdictional rules like the one under review
in Haywood lies not so much in the state’s failure to subordinate its law to
federal law, but in its failure to internalize federal law—to treat federal law as
its own.
This conception of states’ relationship to federal law is also implicit in
the Haywood Court’s reliance on Second Employers’ Liability Cases for the pro-
position that states cannot decline jurisdiction over federal causes of action
on grounds of policy disagreement because doing so “‘presupposes what in
legal contemplation does not exist.’”65  The thing that “does not exist” here
is a distinction between the content of federal policy and the policy of an
individual state.  And the key point, once again, is that federal law and fed-
eral policy are the states’ own; when state courts refuse jurisdiction over fed-
eral claims because of disagreement with federal policy, they disregard this
aspect of our constitutional architecture.66
Unfortunately, the Haywood Court did not develop or return to this
theme.  The opinion simply asserts that states are required to orient them-
selves toward federal law in the specified ways, but offers no argument
(unless gesturing in the direction of the words “Law of the Land” counts as
“argument”) in support of this assertion.67  Moreover, as we have seen
64 Id. at 734–35 (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1876)).
65 Id. at 736 (quoting Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. (Second Employ-
ers’ Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1911)).
66 This point is more fully developed in Caminker, supra note 45, at 1022–26. R
67 This shortcoming is characteristic of the valid excuse cases as a whole.  Some of the
decisions in this line fail to identify any textual foundation for the rule they apply and do
not devote even a single word to the question of what is at stake, from a constitutional
perspective, when state courts decline jurisdiction over federal causes of action. See Mis-
souri ex rel. S. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945);
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hart-
ford R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).  Others do little more than point to the Supremacy Clause
(the “Law of the Land” passage in particular) and, like Haywood, assert that federal law and
policy count as the states’ own. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990); Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947); Mondou, 223 U.S. at 58.
The academic literature relating to this line of cases is much the same.  Thus, some
commentators count the interest in federal supremacy as the primary nationalist value at
stake when it comes to state courts’ obligation to adjudicate federal claims. See, e.g., Martin
H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the
Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 73, 92 (1999); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-
State Conflict of Laws: ‘Actual’ Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1773–84 (1992).  Others focus
attention on the passages highlighted above and emphasize states’ obligation to treat fed-
eral law as their own; but even these commentators tend not to connect this requirement
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already, the Court compounded the problem by repeatedly signaling that the
central constitutional value at stake when state courts decline jurisdiction
over federal causes of action is the value of supremacy, conventionally
understood.
Prior cases in the valid excuse line also hint that the doctrine has its
roots in considerations of union.  In Testa v. Katt, for example, the Justices
reviewed a decision by the Rhode Island Supreme Court dismissing a claim
under the Federal Emergency Price Control Act (EPCA).  The state court
had determined that the EPCA (which authorized the award of treble dam-
ages to successful plaintiffs) was penal in nature, and it insisted that states
“need not enforce the penal laws of a government which is foreign.”68  The
Supreme Court dismissed this reasoning out of hand and invoked the inter-
est in union to explain why:
[W]e cannot accept the basic premise on which the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that it has no more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the
United States than it has to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign
country.  Such a broad assumption flies in the face of the fact that the States of
the Union constitute a nation.69
The Testa Court drew support for its decision—including this particular
passage—from the Supremacy Clause,70 but there is no indication that the
Court was trading in the traditional, federal-law-trumps-state-law sense of
supremacy that would figure so heavily in the Haywood decision.  To the con-
trary, the passage quoted above suggests that state courts’ obligation to enter-
tain federal causes of action is not so much a feature of states’ membership in
to the constitutional interest in union. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 45, at 1024; R
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2011–12 (1993).
Others have argued that Congress is authorized to compel state courts to adjudicate fed-
eral claims by virtue of its Article I power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court of the United States. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferi-
ority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191,
225–28 (2007); Prakash, supra, at 2007–32.  These commentators, too, do not connect state
courts’ obligation along this dimension to the interest in union.
The closest one comes to an exception to this widespread pattern of ignoring union’s
role in the development of the doctrine of valid excuse is a recent article by Professor
Charlton Copeland. See Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism
Through a Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 581 (2010) (noting that when a
state declines jurisdiction over federal causes of action on grounds of policy disagreement,
it “rupture[s] the state’s relationship from the whole”).  Copeland, however, is ultimately
concerned not so much with the duties that flow from states’ membership in a political
union—indeed, he is critical of judicial and scholarly efforts to frame the doctrine of valid
excuse by reference to concepts like power and duty—as with the capacity of the valid
excuse doctrine to reinforce a behavioral norm of “interest inclusion” between the federal
government and the states. Id. at 519–24, 540.
68 Testa, 330 U.S. at 388.
69 Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
70 Id.; see also id. at 390–91, 394 (characterizing the doctrine in supremacy-based
terms).
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a nation in which federal law prevails over state law as it is a natural out-
growth of nationhood itself.
Second Employers’ Liability Cases,71 which is typically regarded as the pro-
genitor of this line of decisions, also contains language hinting at a union-
based foundation for the doctrine.  In that case, the Justices reviewed a deci-
sion of the Connecticut Supreme Court affirming the dismissal of a claim
arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA).  The state court’s
holding was premised, in part, on the notion that the policy reflected in the
FELA “is not in accord with the policy of the State.”72  As noted earlier, the
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning out of hand, explaining that it “pre-
supposes what in legal contemplation does not exist.”73  The Court elabo-
rated: “When Congress . . . adopted [the FELA], . . . it spoke for all the
people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all.”74  Here
too, the crucial point is not so much that federal policy trumps state policy, as
it is that federal policy is state policy.75  The Court’s emphasis in this pas-
sage—reflected in the recurring references to the federal government’s
authority to legislate for “all”—is on Congress’s representation of a political
community that is national in scope and inclusive of the states.
Howlett v. Rose likewise contains indications that the valid excuse doc-
trine is best explained by reference to the interest in union.  In that case, the
Court invalidated a Florida statute that had been construed to extend immu-
nity from actions arising under § 1983 to a local school board.  The Court
drew on Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist 82 to explain its holding:
“When . . . we consider the State governments and the national govern-
ments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE
WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would
have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the
Union.”76
Like the fragments of Testa and Second Employers’ cited above, this passage
suggests that state courts’ obligation to adjudicate federal claims flows not
from federal law’s status as superior to state law, but from states’ responsibili-
ties as members of a political union—in Hamilton’s formulation, as “parts of
one whole.”
71 Mondou, 223 U.S. at 1.
72 Id. at 55.
73 Id. at 57.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 The sentiment is echoed in Testa, which notes that “the policy of the federal Act is
the prevailing policy in every state.”  330 U.S. at 393.  Of course, in unmistakable and
important ways, federal law is not state law.  It is neither enacted by state legislatures nor
signed by state governors.  It is the work-product of representative bodies that have constit-
uencies falling outside of any particular state.  It might have been more accurate for the
Court to say that federal law is the law of the people of every state, and that this triggers
obligations on the part of the states.
76 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 (1990) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 132
(Alexander Hamilton) (E. Bourne ed., 1947)).
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As noted earlier, Howlett also indicates that a state cannot employ a juris-
dictional rule to “dissociate [itself] from federal law.”77  In other words, states
must acknowledge not only that they are bound by federal law, but that they
are bound to federal law.  And although the Court did not say so explicitly,
this feature of states’ relationship to federal law flows from their status as
members of the political community that generated the legislation in
question.
It bears emphasis, finally, that it is not only in scattered passages from
the case law that we can see the relevance of union to the development of
this body of doctrine.  Rather, one of the central elements of the law of valid
excuse—the nondiscrimination requirement—owes its shape and function to
this constitutional value.  The nondiscrimination principle establishes that
states cannot afford federal causes of action less favorable treatment than
they afford parallel causes of action arising under state law.78  But why not?
We have noted already that a litigant whose cause of action is dismissed from
state court on the basis of a jurisdictional rule can simply re-file in an appro-
priate federal court,79 and this is as true when the rule in question is discrimi-
natory as it is when the rule is evenhanded.  So supremacy, once again—at
least in the conventional, trumping sense—cannot serve as the foundation
for the relevant rule, and we are left to wonder what lies behind this long-
standing, and largely uncontroversial,80 feature of the doctrine.
Union is the obvious answer.  When a federal cause of action is dismissed
from state court pursuant to a discriminatory jurisdictional rule, the state
does not deny that its courts are functionally competent to adjudicate the
claim in question.  And since, by hypothesis, the state courts stand ready and
willing to enforce parallel causes of action sounding in state law, it cannot
even be claimed that the dismissal of covered federal claims is an expression
of disagreement with the policy commitments reflected in federal law.  Dis-
missal is required in these cases simply because the cause of action is the
work-product of an outsider political community.81  And it should go without
77 Id. at 371.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 22–23.  Though Haywood makes clear that there R
is more to the doctrine of valid excuse than non-discrimination, it reaffirmed that even-
handed treatment of state and federal claims is a prerequisite to the constitutionality of a
state jurisdictional rule. See supra text accompanying note 28. R
79 See supra text accompanying notes 40–41. R
80 Although the Justices in Haywood split 5-4 on the question of whether a state juris-
dictional rule that applies evenhandedly to state and federal claims might nonetheless vio-
late the Supremacy Clause, only Justice Thomas endorsed the view that a discriminatory
jurisdictional rule could pass constitutional muster. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729,
750 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81 One could imagine defending such a rule on grounds of limited judicial resources,
but this would not suffice to cause our union-based concerns to dissolve, since it would
then raise the question of whether and why the state ought to be allowed to privilege
claims rooted in the law of one political community of which state citizens are a part (the
state itself) over claims derived from the law of another political community of which state
citizens are a part (the nation).
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saying that when a state formally classifies the federal government as an “out-
sider,” it emphasizes political fragmentation rather than unity.  In contrast,
when a federal claim is ousted from state court by virtue of a jurisdictional
rule that applies with equal force to state law claims, there is no prima facie
reason to regard the dismissal as an exercise in dissociation from the national
political community.82  To be sure, an evenhanded state jurisdictional rule
might ultimately prove inconsistent with the constitutional obligations borne
of union—this is the central lesson of the Haywood decision—but the tension
between anti-federal discrimination and the notion of political union is so
screamingly obvious, it is hardly surprising that this feature of the law of valid
excuse was settled upon quickly and has spawned little dissent in the century-
plus since it was first articulated.
It bears repeating that, despite the features of the valid excuse decisions
identified here, the doctrine does not present itself as an exercise in policing
states’ commitment to an ethic of union.  For the most part, the pre-Haywood
82 Consider, for example, the jurisdictional rule upheld by the Court in Herb v. Pit-
cairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945).  That law prevented city courts in the State of Illinois from
adjudicating claims—state or federal—arising outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.  The law was applied in Herb to support the dismissal of an action arising under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Id. at 118.  It is difficult to see how this application of
Illinois law could be construed either as a comment on the merits of the policy embodied
in the FELA or as a general expression of hostility toward federal law.  The fact that the
rule was trans-substantive, together with the fact that it applied to state law claims as well as
federal claims, makes either inference untenable.  From the perspective of union, then,
reliance on the relevant Illinois law to support the dismissal of a federal claim was a non-
event.  To be sure, as Haywood illustrates, formal neutrality is not always a guarantee that
state jurisdictional law is truly neutral as to the substantive content of federal policy.  But
cases like Herb remind us that it can be a telling indicator.
The valid excuse cases have never cast doubt on state courts’ authority to dismiss fed-
eral claims on grounds of a bona fide lack of subject-matter competence, and they have
explicitly affirmed state courts’ authority to dismiss federal claims on the basis of rules of
judicial housekeeping unrelated to the source of the law at issue or the policy it embodies.
See Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 1 (1950) (remanding a case to state court
so that it might reconsider its authority to dismiss a federal claim under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens); Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387–88
(1929) (affirming dismissal of a federal cause of action under a forum non conveniens rule).
This is because state courts’ authority to dismiss federal cases on these sorts of grounds
coexists happily with the values of both supremacy and union.
Professor Weinberg regards forum non conveniens rules as presenting “[p]erhaps the
hardest case” under the doctrine of valid excuse.  Weinberg, supra note 67, at 1775.  She R
explains that, on the one hand, “a state’s territorial unconnectedness with a case may seem
a compelling reason to excuse the state from trying it,” but, on the other hand, “[i]t is hard
to see why there should be a doctrine of excuse from the obligation imposed by the
Supremacy Clause.” Id.  If we understand the relevant obligation in union-based terms,
however, it is not at all hard to see why such an excuse ought to exist.  It is no affront to the
value of union for a state to decline jurisdiction over a federal claim for reasons having
nothing to do with the policy underlying that claim or the fact of its “federalness.”  It is
only when we understand states’ obligation to enforce federal claims in supremacy-based
terms that the forum non conveniens decisions present any kind of puzzle.
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cases are content either to eschew inquiry into underlying constitutional val-
ues or to engage such matters in drive-by fashion only.  And Haywood itself, as
we have seen, ultimately endorses a trumping-oriented supremacy frame.
This is unfortunate not only because it impedes understanding of the law of
valid excuse, but because it prevents us from seeing the connection between
the valid excuse cases and other bodies of law that are rooted in the same
constitutional value.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN UNION: OTHER APPLICATIONS
In this Part, I examine additional contexts in which the Supreme Court
has recognized constraints on state autonomy that are best understood by
reference to the constitutional interest in union.  The principal purpose of
this discussion is to demonstrate that the valid excuse cases are not outliers;
rather, they are part of a broader jurisprudence of union that has application
across a diverse array of subjects in the law of vertical federalism.83  We will
see that the interest in union manifests itself in different ways across doctrinal
contexts, but that the relevant decisions are rooted in overlapping notions of
community, membership, and political identity.
These cases are of further interest because they provide additional evi-
dence of supremacy’s powerful grip on our consciousness when it comes to
matters of vertical federalism.  We will see, again and again, that conventional
explanations for the relevant legal rules are couched in supremacy-based
terms.  And we will see, again and again, that these explanations are wanting.
To make good sense of the law in these contexts, it is necessary to consult the
interest in union.
A. Intergovernmental Tax Immunity
I begin with the law of intergovernmental tax immunity, under which
states have long been prohibited from levying taxes directly on the federal
government or its instrumentalities.  The standard justification for this prohi-
bition is rooted in the interest in national supremacy and was spelled out by
the Court in the seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland.84  “[T]he power to
tax,” Justice Marshall famously wrote, “involves the power to destroy;”85 and
so, if states were empowered to levy taxes against the federal government or
its instrumentalities, “the declaration that the constitution, and the laws
made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, [would be]
empty.”86
83 This discussion will also help to show that the valid excuse decisions are not exam-
ples of an overreaching Court seeking to protect nationalist values where none is under
genuine threat.  Instead, those cases are part of a wide-ranging body of case law demon-
strating that affronts to the interest in union are appropriate subjects for judicial review.
84 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
85 Id. at 431.
86 Id. at 433.
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Until the 1930s, the tax immunity doctrine extended not only to direct
taxation of the federal government, but also to state efforts to tax private
parties’ income from contracts with the United States.  Thus, states could not
tax the salaries of federal employees,87 income from leases of federal prop-
erty,88 or income from federal bonds.89  The Justices reasoned that “any tax
on income a party received under a contract with the government was a tax
on the contract [itself] and thus a tax ‘on’ the government because it bur-
dened the government’s power to enter into the contract.”90  Hence, the
prohibitions on taxation of private income from transactions with the federal
government were thought to follow from the same principles that justify the
prohibition on direct taxation.91
During the New Deal era, however, the Court abandoned the notion
that taxation of private parties’ income from dealings with the United States
was much the same as direct taxation of the federal government.92  It dis-
carded many of the concomitant constraints on states’ taxing authority93 and
replaced them with a requirement of nondiscrimination, under which “the
States can . . . tax any private parties with whom [the United States] does
business . . . as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States
or those with whom it deals.”94  This nondiscrimination rule, too, has tradi-
tionally been justified by reference to the interest in federal supremacy.  As
the Court explained in United States v. County of Fresno:
A tax on the income of federal employees, or a tax on the possessory interest
of federal employees in Government houses, if imposed only on them, could
be escalated by a State so as to destroy the federal function performed by
them either by making the Federal Government unable to hire anyone or by
87 Dobbins v. Comm’rs of Erie Cnty., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435, 450 (1842).
88 Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 505 (1922).
89 Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 469 (1829).  Some of these prohibi-
tions ran in both directions. See, e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127–28
(1870) (prohibiting federal taxation of the salary of a state judge).
90 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 518 (1988); see also Gillespie, 257 U.S. at 506
(holding that a tax on profits from a lease of federal property “is a direct hamper upon
the . . . United States”).
91 See, e.g., Dobbins, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 448 (relying on McCulloch in the course of
holding that states may not tax the salaries of federal employees).
92 See Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939); see also North
Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434 (1990) (plurality opinion) (noting that the
Court’s decision in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937) “decisively
rejected the argument that any state regulation which indirectly regulates the [f]ederal
[g]overnment’s activity is unconstitutional”).
93 See, e.g., Graves, 306 U.S. at 486–87 (upholding the constitutionality of a state tax on
a federal employees’ salary); James, 302 U.S. at 161 (upholding a West Virginia tax levied
against an independent contractor’s gross receipts from a contract with the federal govern-
ment).  This sea change in the law of intergovernmental tax immunity included changes in
the law governing the federal government’s authority to tax the states. See, e.g., Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938) (upholding federal authority to tax the incomes of
most state employees).
94 Baker, 485 U.S. at 523.
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causing the Federal Government to pay prohibitively high salaries.  This dan-
ger would never arise, however, if the tax is also imposed on the income and
property interests of all other residents and voters of the State.95
Thus, the nondiscrimination rule proceeds from the premise that states will
not levy excessive taxes on transactions with the federal government if such
taxes must be “imposed equally on the other similarly situated constituents of
the State.”96  If state taxation can be held in check in this way, the argument
goes, the threat it might otherwise pose to federal supremacy—here in the
form of inhibiting the federal government’s capacity to perform its func-
tions—will dissipate.97
But supremacy is not the only constitutional value underlying this body
of law; the rules have a union-reinforcing character as well and, indeed, some
components of the doctrine are difficult to understand except by reference
to the constitutional interest in union.98  Consider, for example, two modern
tax immunity cases—Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury99 and Barker
v. Kansas100—both of which involved challenges to state rules governing the
taxation of retirement benefits.  Under the relevant state laws, benefits paid
to former employees of state and local government were exempt from taxa-
tion; benefits paid to other employees, including federal employees, were
subject to tax.101  In each case, the Court held that the state could not deny
the exemption to federal employees.102
Crucially, the taxes at issue in both Davis and Barker were not targeted
specifically at employees of the federal government: each covered a massive
pool of state residents, and included federal employees only incidentally.103
This means that the standard, supremacy-based account of the nondiscrimi-
nation rule provides only weak support, if that, for the invalidation of the
schemes under review.  For while these tax regimes did discriminate between
federal and state employees, they did not discriminate between federal
95 429 U.S. 452, 463 n.11 (1977).
96 Id. at 462.
97 See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 819 n.1 (1989).
98 My analysis here tracks that in Halberstam, supra note 4, at 812–15. R
99 489 U.S. 803.
100 503 U.S. 594, 605 (1992).
101 Barker, 503 U.S. at 596; Davis, 489 U.S. at 805.
102 Barker, 503 U.S. at 605; Davis, 489 U.S. at 817.  Technically, both cases involved
application of 4 U.S.C. § 111—the statute through which the United States consented to
the nondiscriminatory taxation of its employees’ income.  As the Davis Court explained,
“Congress drew upon the constitutional doctrine [of intergovernmental tax immunity] in
defining the scope of the immunity retained in § 111,” and so “the retention of immunity
in § 111 is coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes embodied in the
modern constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.” Davis, 489 U.S. at
813.
103 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion in Davis, under the Michigan
taxation scheme at issue in that case, approximately 4.5 million taxpayers were subject to
taxation of their retirement benefits, including some 24,000 retired federal employees.
The exemption covered roughly 130,000 retired state and local government employees.
Davis, 489 U.S. at 821 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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employees and the overwhelming majority of taxpayers.  One would think—
and the standard account posits—that the taxes in question would not be so
oppressive as to seriously burden the legions of employees it covered (if they
were, the argument goes, the state would not have established the taxes in
the first place); and so there appears to have been little basis for concern that
the relevant taxes would be so oppressive as to undermine federal objectives
and threaten the supremacy of federal law.
Justice Stevens pressed this point in his dissenting opinion in Davis.
Relying on the Court’s prior decision in South Carolina v. Baker, he explained:
“[T]he best safeguard against excessive taxation . . . is the requirement that
the government tax in a nondiscriminatory fashion.  For where a govern-
ment imposes a nondiscriminatory tax, judges can term the tax ‘excessive’
only by second-guessing the extent to which the taxing government and its
people have taxed themselves, and the threat of destroying another govern-
ment can be realized only if the taxing government is willing to impose taxes
that will also destroy itself or its constituents.”104
In Justice Stevens’s view, then, the fact that the tax under review was “shared
equally by federal agents and the vast majority of a State’s citizens” supplied a
“‘political check against abuse of the taxing power,’”105 and so “constitu-
tional protection [was] not necessary.”106
Justice Stevens is half right.  It is true that the supremacy-based account
of the nondiscrimination rule cannot explain the results in Davis and Barker,
but this does not mean that the cases are wrongly decided.  Both can be
defended by reference to the constitutional interest in union. Davis and
Barker signal that if states wish to confer a benefit on those who perform
“government” work, they must value work performed by and through the
federal government no less than they do work performed by and through
state and local government.  One could imagine attempting to justify limiting
a state tax exemption to employees of state and local government on the
ground that those employees serve the particular community that is levying
the tax.  But Davis and Barker remind us that federal employees also serve the
particular community that is levying the tax.  If a state wishes to provide bene-
104 Id. at 820 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505, 526 n.15 (1988)).
105 Id. at 819–20 (quoting United States v. Cnty. of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 463 (1977)).
106 Id. at 819.  To imagine a tax rule like the ones at issue in Davis and Barker actually
impeding the achievement of federal objectives, one would have to assume that the exemp-
tion seriously affected the federal government’s ability to compete in labor markets with
state and local government, thus causing the United States to hire individuals less profi-
cient in the implementation of government programs than would be the case absent the
state tax law.  But the notion that a tax exemption that is denied to all private sector
employees would seriously hamper the federal government’s competitive position seems
highly dubious.  As Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion explains, this line of reasoning
requires us to assume that the state was willing to impose a serious disadvantage on private
employers in the state as well.
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fits to the workers who make “their” government tick, then the recipient class
must include federal employees.107
This pocket of the law of intergovernmental tax immunity has a different
inflection from the valid excuse decisions, but the central concerns motivat-
ing the two bodies of doctrine are of a piece.  Both are rooted in a concep-
tion of political identity and in the consequences of membership in a
political union.  The valid excuse cases require states to take ownership of
national law—to acknowledge that federal law belongs to them and to their
citizens (that it is of them and of their citizens), even if state citizens and their
representatives in state government disagree with the policy underlying it.
The tax immunity cases, meanwhile, direct states to acknowledge kinship
with the national government along a different dimension.  It requires them,
in a particularly literal way, to treat federal employees as their own.
B. Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption
The controversial body of Supreme Court decisions establishing the doc-
trine of dormant foreign affairs preemption provides another example of
union at work in the law of vertical federalism.  The seminal case here is
Zschernig v. Miller.108  In Zschernig, the Court invalidated an Oregon statute
that prohibited nonresident aliens from inheriting property in the state
unless it could be shown that citizens of the United States enjoyed reciprocal
rights of inheritance in the alien’s country of citizenship and that any foreign
heir to an Oregon estate would receive the proceeds of that estate without
confiscation by her home government.109  The statute, the Court held, con-
stituted an impermissible “intrusion by the State into the field of foreign
107 Of course, there are limits to this principle.  A municipal police department need
not invite employees of the local FBI office to the department’s holiday party.  And when
state governments raise the salaries of their employees, they are not constitutionally
required to provide salary supplements to locally based employees of the federal govern-
ment (or, for that matter, to non-locally based federal employees who serve local
residents), even if it is true that those employees make “their” government tick every bit as
much as state employees do.  This is because, from the perspective of union, it matters
whether the state is acting in its capacity as an employer (as it is when it pays a salary or
throws a holiday party) or its capacity as a government (as it is when it provides a tax
exemption).  This is because the message the state sends about the character of our union
when it pays its employees’ salaries is, at least arguably, different from the message it sends
when it supplies those employees with a tax exemption that is denied to all others, includ-
ing federal employees.  And this is true notwithstanding the fact that the financial conse-
quences of, and incentives created by, a salary increase may be similar to those that follow
from the establishment of a tax exemption. See id. at 824.  As I explain in Section III.A,
infra, the jurisprudence of union is, as a general matter, fixated on the content of the
messages that are sent by state law.  And so this feature of the law of intergovernmental tax
immunity fits snugly into the pattern established by the cases as a whole.
108 389 U.S. 429, 440–41 (1968).
109 Id. at 430–31.
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affairs[,] which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the
Congress.”110
Beyond asserting repeatedly that the field of foreign affairs is constitu-
tionally off limits to the states,111 the Court struggled to explain the founda-
tion for its holding.  The Justices were concerned that state probate courts
might “disrupt[ ]” U.S. foreign relations or “embarrass[ ]” the United States
by scrutinizing the systems of government in foreign countries and passing
judgment on the earnestness of those countries’ commitment to the protec-
tion of property rights.112  This kind of state intervention into the realm of
foreign policy, the Court suggested, might “affect[ ] international relations in
a persistent and subtle way,”113 “impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s
foreign policy,”114 or “adversely affect the power of the central government
to deal with [foreign relations] problems.”115
The difficulty with this analysis is that it is not possible to identify—and
the Court did not even attempt to flag—a federal enactment, order, rule, or
policy that was jeopardized by Oregon’s probate law.  Indeed, the amicus
brief submitted to the Zschernig Court on behalf of the United States explic-
itly disclaimed the notion that the state law under review “unduly inter-
fere[d] with the [nation’s] conduct of foreign relations.”116  So while the
rhetoric in the majority opinion repeatedly suggests that the decision rests on
a kind of conflict preemption analysis—discussion of state law “impair[ing],”
“adversely affect[ing],” or “unduly interfer[ing] with” federal policy is stan-
dard fare in conflict preemption cases—this fragment of the Court’s reason-
ing is highly suspect.  The Court’s more general statements as to the
impropriety of state intervention in the realm of foreign affairs117—more of
a field preemption construct than a conflict preemption one—appear to pro-
vide a firmer foundation for the judgment.118  Justice Stewart’s concurring
opinion draws attention to this point:
The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, says that the Government does
not “contend that the application of [Oregon law] in the circumstances of
this case unduly interferes with the United States’ conduct of foreign rela-
110 Id. at 432.
111 Id. at 436 (noting that “foreign affairs and international relations” constitute “mat-
ters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”); id. at 437–38
(insisting that “foreign policy attitudes . . . are matters for the Federal Government, not for
local probate courts”).
112 Id. at 435.
113 Id. at 440.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 441.
116 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6 n.5, Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429 (No.
67-21), 1967 WL 113577.
117 See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. R
118 By this I mean only that the Court’s conclusions follow more readily from the stated
premises when one deploys a field preemption model.  I do not mean to suggest that the
field preemption approach to Zschernig is immune from criticism. See infra note 137 and R
accompanying text.
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tions.”  But that is not the point.  We deal here with the basic allocation of
power between the States and the Nation. . . . [T]he conduct of our foreign
affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the National Government, not
to the probate courts of the several States.119
What is important for our purposes is that—in contrast to the conflict
preemption approach to the Zschernig problem, which is firmly grounded in
the value of national supremacy120—the field preemption model, at least as
applied here, owes much to the value of union.  Once again, Justice Stewart’s
opinion is on point.  With respect to “local interests,” he explains, “the sev-
eral States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our rela-
tions with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”121
From this perspective, the relevant limits on states’ authority are less about
guaranteeing that federal law will trump conflicting state law than they are
about the structure and meaning of political union.122  Where foreign affairs
are at stake, the case indicates, the only relevant political unit is the nation.
The Court’s latest pronouncement on the law of dormant foreign affairs
preemption—the decision in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi123—is of
like character.  That case involved California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act (HVIRA), which required insurance companies doing business in
California to disclose information about policies sold in Europe before and
during the Holocaust.124  The Court determined that the HVIRA was pre-
empted because it “interfere[d] with the National Government’s conduct of
foreign relations.”125  In reaching this conclusion, the majority focused its
attention on executive agreements between the United States and three
European countries (Germany, Austria, and France) relating to the settle-
ment of Holocaust era claims.  It held, in particular, that there was a “suffi-
119 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
120 Commentators routinely characterize Zschernig in supremacy-based terms. See, e.g.,
Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585,
601 (2006) (“Zschernig v. Miller affirmed the supremacy of federal law in the area of foreign
relations.” (footnote omitted)); Louise Weinberg, Methodological Interventions and the Slavery
Cases; or, Night-Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316, 1335 n.86 (1997) (similar).
121 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
122 As is the case with respect to union’s role in the valid excuse cases, I am not strongly
committed to the notion that the Supremacy Clause cannot supply the textual hook for the
work I am assigning to “union.”  Nor do I mean to reject the possibility that the value I am
drawing attention to might be subsumed within the concept of supremacy.  What matters
to me, rather, is that we (1) recognize the interest at stake in these cases as something
different from the interest in federal law superseding contrary state law, and (2) under-
stand that the values at stake in these cases are rooted in a conception of what it means to
be a member of a political union.  The labels are important to the extent they help clarify
these two points.
123 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
124 See id. at 401.
125 Id.
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ciently clear conflict” between the HVIRA and the policies embodied in
those agreements to support preemption of the California law.126
In that case, too, the Court’s preemption analysis is unusually vulnerable
to criticism.127  To begin with, the executive agreements that provide the
foundation for the Court’s preemption analysis contain no preemption
clause;128 and they say nothing at all about “state disclosure laws specifically,
or . . . information disclosure generally.”129  More generally, the agreements
in question do not commit the United States government to do much of
anything when it comes to substantive outcomes in reparations cases.  As the
dissenting Justices emphasized, “none of the executive agreements extin-
guish[ed] any underlying claim for relief;”130 and, indeed, the central com-
mitment the United States government did make through its agreement with
Germany—to encourage U.S. courts to dismiss Holocaust era claims in light
of U.S. foreign policy—was clearly designated by the agreement itself to be
without legally binding effect.131  The Court, then, was hard pressed to
ground its finding of federal-state conflict in the particulars of the executive
agreements on which its preemption analysis is centered.  It was left to focus,
instead, on alleged tension between the HVIRA and “policy objectives
implicit in the . . . agreements.”132  This, the dissenters emphasized, was
unprecedented.  For the key cases affirming the preemptive effect of execu-
tive agreements relating to the settlement of claims all “gave effect to the
express terms of an executive agreement;” they did not rely on notions of
implied preemption.133
126 Id. at 420.
127 To be fair, Garamendi is no Zschernig.  In Garamendi, at least, the Government
insisted that the law under review in fact interfered with federal policy. Id. at 413.  And in
Garamendi, unlike Zschernig, it was possible to identify concrete articulations of federal for-
eign policy that were related to the same general subject matter (reparations for Holocaust
victims) as the state law under review. See id. at 405–08.  Nevertheless, for the reasons
detailed above, see infra text accompanying notes 128–31, the preemption analysis in
Garamendi—at least to the extent it rests on claims of conflict between state and federal
law—is something of a stretch.
128 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417.
129 Id. at 441 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 440.
131 Id.; see id. at 406 (majority opinion).
132 Id. at 439 (Ginsburg. J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 440 (emphasis added).  The Court’s preemption analysis is also subject to
criticism on the related ground that the Court characterized the federal policy objectives
arguably threatened by the HVIRA in highly abstract and general terms.  This is perhaps
best encapsulated by a State Department official’s expression of concern that the HVIRA
“threatened to damage the cooperative spirit” that the United States sought to foster in
connection with the processing of Holocaust-era insurance claims. Id. at 411 (majority
opinion).  The point is reinforced by the majority’s summation of its preemption analysis
with the observation that “[t]he basic fact is that California seeks to use an iron fist where
the President has consistently chosen kid gloves.” Id. at 427.  Conflict preemption—even
in its more nebulous “frustrates the purpose” form—tends to rest on sharper tensions than
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As is true of the Zschernig decision, the holes in Garamendi’s conflict pre-
emption analysis provide reason to think that something other than the
potential undermining of federal policy and the supremacy of federal law is
at stake here; and here too, it seems reasonable to conclude that what is at
stake is a conception of political union.  There are signals to that effect in
Garamendi itself.  Thus, before getting into the nitty-gritty of its preemption
analysis, the Court quoted Madison’s Federalist No. 42 for the proposition that
“[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect
to other nations.”134  And, the Court drew support for the conception of
government structure underlying its decision by gesturing at dormant for-
eign commerce doctrine, which is routinely justified by reference to the
importance of having the nation speak with one voice when regulating com-
merce beyond its borders.135  Framed this way, the core principle driving the
decision in Garamendi is not that state law and policy must give way to federal
law and policy under conditions of conflict, but that, where foreign relations
are at issue, it is an entailment of political union that states get out of the
way.136
those created by alleged interference with a “cooperative spirit” or deviation from some
ethos of “tread lightly.”
134 Id. at 414 (majority opinion) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 (James
Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
135 Id. (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (emphasizing
“the [n]ational [g]overnment’s ability to speak with ‘one voice’ in regulating commerce
with foreign countries”)).
136 The Court’s intervening decision in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363 (2000), can be understood in the same light.  That case involved a Massachusetts law
restricting the authority of state agencies to purchase goods or services from companies
doing business with Burma. Id. at 366.  The Court unanimously determined that the law in
question frustrated the purposes of (and was therefore preempted by) federal law. Id. at
388.  Here, the arguments for conflict preemption appear stronger than those available in
Garamendi (and certainly stronger than those available in Zschernig), since the Crosby Court
was confronted with federal statutory provisions that at least spoke to the set of issues
addressed by the state law under review. Id. at 374.  As others have noted, however, the
Court’s analysis deviates sufficiently from traditional preemption doctrine so as to raise the
suspicion that the decision is best explained as another exercise in Zschernig-style dormant
foreign affairs preemption. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and
the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 171–73 (2001) (describing ways in
which the analysis in Crosby deviates from ordinary principles of preemption and sug-
gesting that aspects of the Court’s reasoning “transform ordinary preemption doctrine into
a dormant prohibition, little different from the dormant foreign affairs . . . doctrine[ ]”
developed in Zschernig, and deployed by the First Circuit in Crosby itself); see also RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
752 (5th ed. 2003) (drawing on Professor Young’s analysis of Crosby and explaining that
“[s]ome commentators view the analysis in Crosby . . . as sufficiently different from standard
preemption analysis as to constitute a kind of dormant foreign affairs preemption ‘in dis-
guise[,]’ in which the driving force for invalidation was less the federal statute and more
the foreign affairs subject matter”).  As is true of Zschernig and Garamendi (and for the very
same reasons), to the extent our understanding of Crosby veers away from a conflict model
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To be clear, I don’t mean to endorse the conception of foreign relations
preemption that appears to flow from the more sweeping statements in the
majority and concurring opinions in these cases.  Indeed, I think there’s
something to the oft-heard criticism that the Court’s rhetoric (especially in
Zschernig) unnecessarily casts doubt on the permissibility of some rather
mundane exercises of state judicial power.137  But the cases do not need to
carve the universe of foreign affairs preemption with satisfying precision in
order to support my central claim: across a diverse array of cases, the interest
in union looms large in the minds of the Justices and appears better adapted
to explaining the contours of the law of vertical federalism than the
supremacy-based accounts typically favored by judges and commentators.
Here, the thrust of the constitutional interest in union is not (as we have
previously seen) that things federal “belong” to the states, but that states must
take heed of the fact that they belong to something federal.
C. Carrington v. Rash
The Supreme Court’s decision in Carrington v. Rash,138 a voting rights
case decided in 1965, is likewise best explained by reference to the interest in
union.  The case involved a provision of the Texas Constitution that prohib-
ited members of the United States Armed Forces who moved to Texas during
their military service from voting in any elections in the state.139  The
Supreme Court struck the provision down on the ground that it constituted
“invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”140  As
Professor Black pointed out in his famous lectures, Structure and Relationship
in Constitutional Law,141 it is not difficult to identify a rational justification for
the policy under review in Carrington, and so the Court’s Equal Protection
analysis seems incomplete and unsatisfying.142
and toward a field preemption construct, it becomes easier to see the decision as a reflec-
tion of the constitutional interest in union.
137 See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 461–62 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in
the result); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1847 (1998).
138 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
139 Id. at 89.
140 Id. at 96.
141 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969).
142 The state had argued that “it ha[d] a legitimate interest in immunizing its elections
from the concentrated balloting of military personnel, whose collective voice may over-
whelm a small local civilian community.” Carrington, 380 U.S. at 93.  Professor Black, echo-
ing Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion from Carrington itself, was unprepared to dismiss
this justification as “wholly capricious and arbitrary, or as ‘unreasonable’ in th[e] constitu-
tional sense.” BLACK, supra note 141, at 10.  “Military personnel,” he explained, “are sub- R
ject to special pressures and might be present in such numbers as simply to take over small
communities.  They come under orders, and they leave when ordered away; their resi-
dence is not a matter of their own desire or intention but of military exigence.” Id.
Hence, “[t]he action of Texas was not really ‘arbitrary’ in that case; there are differences
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Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that the decision in Carrington
lacks constitutional foundation.  The key to understanding the case, as Pro-
fessor Black pointed out, is to frame the central issue as one of constitutional
structure and not individual constitutional right.  Black explained as follows:
“The real question is whether we think Texas . . . should be allowed to annex
a disability solely to federal military service,” not whether Texas’s decision to
inflict such a unique disability on servicemembers is amenable to rational
justification.143
Up to this point, I am generally in accord with Professor Black’s reason-
ing.  We part ways, however, with respect to his next move.  Black insisted
that a state could not inflict such a disability on servicemembers because
the subjecting of a federal soldier, strictly as such and on no other showing
than that of his being a federal soldier, to an adverse discrimination, so
clearly tended to impede the operation of the national government as to be
forbidden quite without regard to its violation of any specific textual
guarantee.144
While I agree that the law under review in Carrington was unconstitutional
without regard to “any specific textual guarantee,” I think it far from clear
that the law threatened, as Black suggested, “to impede the operation of the
national government.”
Perhaps Black imagined that provisions like the Texas voting law would
lead to reduced enlistment in the military.  Would-be servicemembers might
balk, the argument goes, at being unable to vote in their states of residence;
and they might decline to enlist if it meant that such a voting disability would
take hold.  I very much doubt this.  Indeed, the assumption strikes me as
fanciful and it supplies only weak support, at best, for his claim that the provi-
sion under review in Carrington posed some sort of threat to the achievement
of national objectives and the interest in federal supremacy.
I am inclined to think, instead, that the decision in Carrington is rooted
in the value of union.  The provision under review in that case denied the
franchise to parties who performed an exceedingly important function for
our nation, and only parties who performed that function.  In this way, the
Texas law seems inimical to our sense of union and “common enterprise.”145
This comes through (albeit fleetingly) in the very last passage from the
majority opinion in Carrington, which states: “[T]he uniform of our coun-
try . . . [must not] be the badge of disenfranchisement for the man or woman
between military people and other people with respect to the meaning of their residence,”
and “[g]iving effect to those differences is well within the latitude we ordinarily allow to
the state, in the general case, under the equal protection clause.” Id. at 13; see also Car-
rington, 380 U.S. at 99–101 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (similar).
143 BLACK, supra note 141, at 13. R
144 Id. at 23–24.
145 See Halberstam, supra note 4, at 814–15 (describing the obligation of union for R
members of a federal system as one of “fidelity to the common enterprise”).
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who wears it.”146  Note that the Court did not attempt to buttress this claim
with a functional argument.  That is, the Justices did not contend—as Profes-
sor Black would in his lecture a few years later—that a state’s disenfranchise-
ment of service members is problematic because it might impede the
operation of the national government.  The Justices were content, rather, to
intimate that there is something unseemly about adding disenfranchisement
to the costs of military service.  And this unseemliness, I think, is rooted in
the fact of our nationhood.
It is telling that Professor Black offered a supremacy-based justification
for the decision in Carrington v. Rash despite the fact that his threat-to-
national-supremacy story is so weak and the union-based account has so
much to recommend it.147  Black, “the dean of structural constitutional inter-
pretation,”148 is not likely to have been attracted to a supremacy model just
because—in contrast to the union-based approach—it can straightforwardly
be grounded in a particular fragment of constitutional text.149  Indeed, the
central point of Black’s discussion of Carrington is to extol the virtues of a
structural approach over the clause-bound Equal Protection frame favored by
the Court.150  Yet still he reached for a dubious supremacy-based argument
when a sounder, union-based account was available to him.  This is a striking
indication of our collective failure to acknowledge union as an operative con-
stitutional value in cases involving the relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the states; it signals that, when nationalist values come under
threat, we reach reflexively for the classic supremacy model.151
III. UNDERSTANDING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF UNION
The cases surveyed in Parts I and II demonstrate that the value of union
does important, independent, work in shaping the law of vertical federalism.
But it is safe to say—even with this account of the case law in place—that the
nature and contours of the union-based constraints on state autonomy
remain opaque.  This is the case, no doubt, because union is typically part of
the subtext, not the text, of the relevant Supreme Court decisions.  And even
146 Carrington, 380 U.S. at 97 (alterations in original) (quoting Message of Governor
Ellis Arnall to General Assembly of Georgia 5 (January 3, 1944)).
147 Black’s analysis contains faint hints at a more union-oriented understanding of Car-
rington (or, at least, language that is consistent with a union-based approach). See BLACK,
supra note 141, at 11 (advocating focus on “the logic of national structure”).  Nevertheless, R
he ultimately opted for a supremacy-based model. See id. at 17–19.
148 Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1621
(1990).
149 Union is, of course, referenced explicitly in the very first sentence of the Constitu-
tion.  But the Preamble is not generally treated as a source of constraint on government
that can be relied upon as a foundation for legal doctrine.
150 See BLACK, supra note 141, at 8, 96. R
151 Black does focus attention on the interest in union in his discussion of the right to
travel and dormant commerce doctrine. See id. at 16, 21.  But, of course, those rules form
part of the law of horizontal federalism, where union-based justification are far more famil-
iar. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. R
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when union does fight its way to the surface of the Court’s opinions, discus-
sion of that value tends to be obscured in a fog of supremacy-speak or is too
brief to allow for consideration of its precise shape or application across dif-
ferent contexts.  As a result, many challenging questions about the jurispru-
dence of union remain to be answered.  This Part takes the first steps toward
doing so.
In Section III.A, I examine the nature of the union-based constraints on
state autonomy.152  I argue, in particular, that these constraints are largely
concerned with the expressive significance of the law.  They are focused, in
other words, on what the laws in question say or what they mean, not on what
they do.153  This observation is important because it provides us with a clearer
sense of what, exactly, these bodies of doctrine intend to police; this, in turn,
should improve our capacity to identify other species of state action that
might raise problems from the perspective of union.
Next, in Section III.B, I take up the question of whether the jurispru-
dence of union represents a sound exercise in constitutional federalism.  It is
one thing to show that careful attention to the value of union can help us to
understand what the Justices are up to in a series of cases, and it is quite
another to show that the conception of union endorsed in those cases is com-
pelling as a matter of constitutional law.  Section III.B thus assesses the juris-
prudence of union from the perspective of constitutional text and history,
the functional values traditionally associated with our federalism, considera-
tions of constitutional structure, and precedent.
We will see that analysis under some of these interpretive modalities
(text, history, functional concerns) proves inconclusive, while one (structural
analysis) provides at least partial reason to think that the jurisprudence of
union stands on firm constitutional ground.  The last one (precedent) is
something of a mixed bag.  On the one hand, the bodies of case law we have
examined already constitute the core of our precedential tradition relating to
the union-based constraints on state autonomy.  In a sense, then, the ques-
tion of whether the jurisprudence of union is a good fit with established pre-
cedent has been asked and answered.  But the precedential story is
complicated by the Supreme Court’s much debated decisions in New York v.
United States154 and Printz v. United States.155  As we will see, those cases rest on
152 When I refer here to “the union-based constraints on state autonomy,” what I really
mean is “the union-based constraints on state autonomy that emerge from the cases sur-
veyed in Parts I and II.”  As noted at the outset, see supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text,
union does widely recognized work constraining states in horizontal federalism cases.  But
those union-based legal rules are beyond the scope of my analysis.
153 We might say, instead, that the cases are concerned with the expressive significance
of the Supreme Court decisions that review the state laws in question. See Evan H.
Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 81, 84
(2001) (noting that “[b]oth a statute and a judicial decision can have expressive signifi-
cance by articulating and reinforcing norms that are constitutive of a society’s very identity
and self-understanding”).  I don’t think anything turns on which formulation we use.
154 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
155 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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a conception of union that is vastly different from the one we have encoun-
tered thus far.
I conclude my analysis in Section III.C with some speculative thoughts as
to how the jurisprudence of union might operate in contexts not yet
addressed by the courts.  As I attempt, in the discussion that follows, to
deepen our understanding of the union-based constraints on state auton-
omy, I will focus once again (especially in Section III.B) on the valid excuse
cases and on the particular conception of union they (implicitly) develop
and apply.  I do this, in part, because those cases have received the most
sustained treatment in my analysis to this point and because the relevant
body of Supreme Court decisions is relatively large and therefore provides
the most raw material to work with.  Moreover, those decisions come with a
particularly rich body of scholarly commentary in tow.  This commentary
sheds light on how this fragment of the jurisprudence of union may fit into
our federalism more generally, and so it provides a useful starting point for
analysis (and, sometimes, a foil).  As I have emphasized, however, the valid
excuse cases represent but one variation on a coherent theme that drives a
wide range of Supreme Court decisions.  Thus,  even though I focus my
attention here on a particular set of union-oriented decisions, the analysis
that follows applies to the jurisprudence of union as a whole.156
A. Union and Vertical Federalism: Understanding the Constraints
1. Union and Expressivism
The union-based constraints on state autonomy are largely concerned
with the expressive significance of the law.  Expressive theories of U.S. consti-
tutional law are rooted in the notion that “[p]ublic policies can violate the
Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs but because
the meaning they convey expresses inappropriate respect for relevant consti-
tutional norms.”157  What matters, for purposes of these theories, are not the
immediate, tangible consequences of government action, but “the ideas or
attitudes expressed through [that] action.”158  We have seen already that the
direct material consequences of at least some of the laws at issue in the
156 A partial exception to the generalizability of the discussion that follows relates to my
claims about the expressivist focus of the jurisprudence of union.  Although the foreign
affairs preemption cases, see supra Section II.B, are properly understood in union-based
terms, and although I think they, too, are concerned with the expressive significance of the
statutes at issue, it is also the case that those decisions lend themselves somewhat more
readily than the others studied here to conventional, consequentialist, justification. See
infra note 159. R
157 Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 755 (1998).
158 Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
506–07 (1993).  This is not to say that consequences are necessarily irrelevant to expressive
theories of law. See infra note 166. R
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Court’s union-oriented decisions are uncertain.159  And that alone provides
cause to wonder whether those decisions are motivated by expressivist consid-
erations.  What’s more, although the relevant cases engage the constitutional
interest in union only fleetingly, many of the passages from the case law that
do refer (or, at least, allude) to this interest are most easily understood in
expressivist terms.
Consider, for example, the Court’s insistence, in Testa v. Katt, that the
Rhode Island statute under review “flies in the face of the fact that the States
of the Union constitute a nation;”160 or take the Court’s admonition in Hay-
wood v. Drown that “a State cannot employ a jurisdictional rule ‘to dissociate
[itself] from federal law.’”161  If we presume that the doctrine of valid excuse
is concerned only with the direct material consequences of state jurisdic-
tional law, and not with the ideas or attitudes such law expresses, then it
becomes difficult to know what to make of these passages.  (What ill effects
follow from a state thumbing its nose at the fact of our nationhood?  And
what immediate, tangible harms result from a state’s dissociation from fed-
eral law?)  If, however, we proceed from the premise that it is constitutionally
problematic for a state to use its jurisdictional law to reject the norms
endorsed by our national political community, and that it is problematic
because doing so emphasizes separation between nation and state and
thereby expresses the wrong view of our union, then the concerns raised by
the Court in these passages become fully intelligible.  For to say that a state
law flies in the face of our status as a nation, or dissociates the state from
159 See supra text accompanying notes 40–41 (explaining that the consequences—for R
litigants and for federal law—of the jurisdiction-based dismissal of federal claims from state
court are minimal); text accompanying notes 104–05 (raising questions about a conse- R
quentialist justification for certain fragments of the law of intergovernmental tax immu-
nity).  A consequentialist anxiety operates closer to the forefront of the foreign affairs
preemption cases, insofar as those decisions are motivated, in part, by concern about the
costs to the nation of state intervention in the realm of foreign affairs. See, e.g., Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (“‘Experience has shown that international controver-
sies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or
imagined wrongs to another’s subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.’” (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941))); see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396, 414 (2003) (“[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a
PART.” (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961))).  But even in this context, there is reason to think that expres-
sivist concerns are doing at least some work in driving the development of the doctrine.
For even if state intervention in the realm of foreign affairs carries some of the risks flag-
ged by the Court in these cases, those risks will often be remote, and so the complete
ouster of states from the domain seems a rather aggressive prophylactic rule.  The rule
makes good sense, however, if we conceive of it in expressivist terms and imagine that the
Court is concerned not so much with the possibility that states will do genuine violence to
national interests, but with the fact that state-level intervention in foreign affairs simply
misunderstands states’ role within our federal system.
160 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947).
161 556 U.S. 729, 736 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S.
356, 371 (1990)).
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federal law, is to say that the law in question expresses and emphasizes sepa-
ration from, and not kinship with, the national political community.
Consider also, in this vein, the Second Employers’ Court’s oft-quoted claim
that the policy embodied in federal law “is as much the policy of Connecticut
as if [it] had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected
accordingly in the courts of the state.”162  To begin with, the command for
“respect” sounds in the register of expression; it is a directive that states
adopt a particular attitude toward federal law and the federal government.
Without the expressivist overlay, moreover, we are left to wonder why Con-
necticut must treat federal law as if it emanated from its own legislature.
Neither the passage itself nor the surrounding discussion from Second Employ-
ers’ supplies an answer.  Here too, however, if we presume that states cannot
use their jurisdictional law to express separation from federal law and policy,
then the requirement that states respect federal law as they do their own
explains itself.
An expressivist understanding of this body of law also helps to explain
the Court’s fixation, from the earliest stages of the doctrine’s development,
on the question of whether state jurisdictional rules discriminate against fed-
eral causes of action.163  State discrimination against federal claims is a sharp,
particularly transparent, way of expressing separation from our national
political community.  When a federal cause of action is dismissed pursuant to
a discriminatory jurisdictional scheme, the state bluntly proclaims the cause
in question to be “not its own” (and disfavored for that reason alone).  If we
presume that this body of doctrine is centrally concerned with the expressive
significance of the laws at issue, then it is hardly surprising that the Court was
quick to flag as constitutionally problematic this rather stark means of expres-
sing a state’s separateness from our national political community.
2. Two Approaches Toward Union and Expressivism
Even if one is persuaded by the claim that the jurisprudence of union is
motivated by expressivist considerations, the question remains why we ought
to care about laws that send the wrong message about our union.  What,
exactly, is so bad about laws of this sort, and what reason is there to think that
our Constitution takes a position on the question?164  The cases, unfortu-
nately, provide no answers.  This is one of the significant casualties of the
162 Mondou v. N.Y, New Haven & Hartford R.R. (Second Employers’ Liability Cases),
223 U.S. 1, 57 (1911).
163 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. R
164 Numerous commentators have joined issue on the question of whether expressive
theories of law, generally, and/or expressive theories of U.S. constitutional law, in particu-
lar, are persuasive. Compare, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 9, with Matthew D. Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).  I will not
engage this debate at so high a level of generality.  Instead, I will focus my attention on the
narrower question of whether and why someone open to the possibility of grounding con-
stitutional doctrine in expressivist considerations might find the jurisprudence of union
compelling.
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Court’s consistent failure to explore the interest in union in any detail—it
leaves us in the dark as to why this particular constitutional value is safe-
guarded in this particular way.  Perhaps the best way to think about the prob-
lem, then, is to examine the jurisprudence of union in light of the analytic
frameworks that have been developed to explain expressivist theories in
other contexts.  I have in mind here the two broad categories into which
commentators tend to divide expressivist theories of constitutional law—con-
sequentialist and non-consequentialist.  In the subsections that follow, I con-
sider the jurisprudence of union from each of these perspectives.
a. A Consequentialist Model: State Law and the Shaping of Public
Attitudes
I noted above that it is a defining feature of expressivist theories of con-
stitutional law that they are not concerned with the direct material conse-
quences of government action.  So it might be surprising to learn that some
expressivist theories travel under the heading “consequentialist.”  But the
effects of government conduct need not be entirely irrelevant to expressivists,
for some expressivist theories focus attention on the capacity of government
expression to mold social norms and thereby affect judgments and behav-
ior.165  These theories are consequentialist because they are ultimately justified
by reference to the effects of government action, but they are expressivist
because it is the social meaning of government action that triggers the rele-
vant effects.
A consequentialist (expressivist) account of the jurisprudence of union
might posit that when state laws express the wrong view of our union, they
threaten to foster among citizens a sense of alienation from the national gov-
ernment.  And this, the argument goes, might have an adverse effect on the
federal government’s capacity to implement national policy.  Seen in this
light, the constitutional interest in union is parasitic on the interest in
national supremacy.  Union matters, on this theory, because the erosion of
our sense of national identity might decrease the likelihood that states and
their citizens will respect the supremacy of federal law.166  The presumed
165 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2024–29 (1996); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 158, at 509; Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection R
and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 569–84 (2003).
166 Although this line of argument is speculative (a point I will return to in a moment),
it has intuitive appeal.  In order for a federation of states that has delegated meaningful
lawmaking authority to a central government to function well, individual members must be
willing, across some policy domain, to subordinate local preferences to those of the nation.
When the general considerations that motivated the decision to enter into a political
union seem remote from a particular policy question (or perhaps even when they don’t),
this subordination might not come easily.  All else being equal, member-state willingness to
comply with federal policy should be positively correlated with citizens’ sense of identifica-
tion with the national government.  The jurisprudence of union, then, might be under-
stood as an exercise in political conditioning, the central goal of which is to encourage
habits of mind and behavior that are conducive to securing state compliance with federal
directives.  Whether and how state laws of the sort examined in Parts I and II are likely to
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“erosion,” on this account, would take place not because people are generally
aware of, say, the content of state jurisdictional law or the distinctions a state
might draw among different categories of retirees for purposes of a tax
exemption.  Rather, it would kick in because government officials (at least
some of them) are aware of these sorts of things.  And their sensibilities about
the federal government can be shaped, in part, by the legal norms that guide
their decisions—in particular, norms governing when and how state officials
interact with the federal government and federal law.167
From this point, the consequentialist account might run in two (non-
mutually exclusive) directions.  First, we might posit that state officials who
internalize the message that citizens’ bonds of kinship with the federal gov-
ernment are comparatively thin will exercise their authority accordingly.
They might enact laws that are inimical to federal policy—that actually do
undermine federal objectives—or enforce existing law with an eye to dimin-
ishing the capacity of the national government to shape local affairs.  Second,
we might imagine that state officials, who can exert significant influence over
public debate, will transmit to the public at large the lessons they learn about
the relationships among the federal government, the states, and the people.
And this, in turn, might stimulate resistance to the impositions of the federal
government.
It is tempting to dismiss this line of reasoning on the ground that peo-
ple’s sense of political identity is shaped by forces grander than those at issue
in the union-based decisions surveyed above.  Thoughtful commentators
have emphasized the role of transformative events such as war, mass immigra-
tion, advances in communication and transportation technology, and the
development of the modern administrative state in stimulating the develop-
ment in the United States of a widespread sense of national political iden-
tity.168  But it would be a mistake to overlook the nationalizing, norm-
generating capacity of basic features of our governmental architecture, such
as the conditions under which state institutions and officials may and must
grapple with federal law.  These foundational rules of engagement provide a
framework for the day-to-day operations of government and send authorita-
tive signals about what is possible, what is ordinary, and what is out-of-bounds
within the confines of our federal system.
Alexander Hamilton highlighted these dynamics in Federalist No. 27, in
the course of discussing states’ role in the implementation of federal law.  He
explained:
affect public attitudes toward the national government is open to question.  But if they did
have such an effect, it would strengthen the case for the interventions we see in the case
law.
167 Cf. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 10, at 133–40 (outlining, albeit skeptically, argu- R
ments relating to the capacity of the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine to
“inculcate a sensitivity among lower courts and governmental officials to the importance of
values of federalism”).
168 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY & TRAGIC
COMPROMISE 100–15 (2008).
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[E]mploy[ing] the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the execution of
[federal] laws . . . will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all
distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and will
give the Federal Government the same advantage for securing due obedi-
ence to its authority, which is enjoyed by the government of each State; in
addition to the influence on public opinion, which will result from the
important consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and sup-
port the resources of the whole Union.169
Others took a different view, during the early constitutional period and after,
of how best to cultivate among the people a sense of connection to federal
law.170  For present purposes, however, what matters is not whether Hamil-
ton or these other commentators had the best understanding of how to forge
a sense of connection between the federal government and the people.
What matters is that all of these commentators took as their premise that
widely held sensibilities about the federal government and federal law might
be shaped, in part, by constitutional practice relating to state institutions’
interface with that law.  And this, in turn, lends support to a consequentialist
justification for the Court’s policing of state expression relating to the nature
of our union.
Perhaps the most pressing reason to be skeptical about this consequen-
tialist account is that identifying “the effects of a message” is a highly specula-
tive endeavor.171  It is difficult for courts to make accurate assessments of
how people will understand and respond to the messages embedded in gov-
ernment action.  Thus, we might balk at the prospect of assigning a rationale
to the jurisprudence of union that relies on judges’ capacity to perform this
sort of calculus.172
In light of the difficulties that inhere in determining the likely conse-
quences of the government’s delivery of any particular message, an appropri-
ately modest consequentialist theory would consider the effects of
government expression at the wholesale level.  Thus, we ought not to ask
whether it is probable that a particular state law or Supreme Court decision
will shape union-related social norms in one way or another; rather, we
should ask whether the law’s repeated, multi-front reinforcement of a mes-
sage (“states must treat the federal government and federal law as their
169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961).
170 See, e.g., Federal Judiciary. No. II., WASH. FEDERALIST, Jan. 28, 1801 at 2 (suggesting
that the “tribunals [of the United States] must be established throughout the Union, [in
order] to bring the authority of the Federal Judiciary closer to the feelings, understanding,
and affections of all the citizens”); see also Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the
State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 561 (1925) (quoting the same article from the Washing-
ton Federalist).
171 See Primus, supra note 165, at 571. R
172 Cf. Caminker, supra note 153, at 90 (“Can the Court correctly predict how the peo- R
ple, even assuming they are aware of the issue at all, will perceive and internalize judicial
protection of states from private damages claims?”); see also Adler & Kreimer, supra note
10, at 137–38 (highlighting the difficulty of discerning the effect of judicial decisions on R
social norms).
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own”) has the capacity to shape attitudes toward our union.  That possibility,
I think, is not so easily dismissed.
b. A Non-Consequentialist Model: Union and the Constitution of
Political Identity
An alternative way of thinking about the expressivist considerations
underlying the jurisprudence of union is to eschew entirely any claims about
the consequences of government expression and to insist that, at least in
some circumstances, government expression can be “intrinsically impor-
tant.”173  It can be important because “norms demanding public acknowledg-
ment of the respect we owe to one another, or that groups and States owe to
one another, are constitutive of the ways important relationships are mutu-
ally understood.”174  On this account, government expression plays a crucial
role in constituting “the political identity of a state.”175  It tells us, and helps
make us, who we are as a political community by “speaking on behalf of the
nation’s basic principles and commitments.”176  From this perspective, state
laws (or, for that matter, federal laws), that rest on a mistaken conception of
our political identity can be constitutionally suspect for that reason alone.
In different ways, the statutes addressed through the jurisprudence of
union downplay the significance of national political identity.  Many of these
statutes seem to take as their premise that political identity is, or should be,
predominantly oriented toward the state and not the nation.  And some sig-
nal, in particular, that state law “belongs” to the people in a way that federal
law does not.  The jurisprudence of union teaches that our Constitution takes
a different view: it frowns upon these parochial conceptions of political iden-
tity in favor of one focused on what we hold in common as citizens of the
United States.177
173 Adler & Kreimer, supra note 10, at 134. R
174 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 1561; see also Caminker, supra note 153, at 84 R
(“Both a statute and a judicial decision can have expressive significance by articulating and
reinforcing norms that are constitutive of a society’s very identity and self-
understanding.”).
175 Jean Hampton, Punishment, Feminism and Political Identity: A Case Study in the Expres-
sive Meaning of the Law, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 23, 23 (1998); see also id. (noting that
“the expressive nature of certain laws can be essential in the creation, maintenance or
revision of a unifying identity for that society”).
176 Sunstein, supra note 165, at 2028. R
177 In the course of developing expressivist accounts of other pockets of constitutional
law, commentators have focused on the interest in eschewing divisive conceptions of citi-
zenship. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 1533–34 (noting that “[e]qual
[p]rotection doctrine . . . opposes laws that, by giving too much weight to suspect classifica-
tions, express a divisive conception of citizens—a conception that represents their racial,
ethnic, religious, or other parochial identities as more important than their common iden-
tity as citizens of the United States”); id. at 1548 (noting that Establishment Clause doc-
trine reflects the Court’s worry that “state aid to parochial schools could inspire citizens to
identify themselves primarily along religious lines, to regard those not belonging to their
religion as antagonists, and thereby to submerge their common identities as U.S. citizens
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Of course, this raises the question of whether the conception of political
identity endorsed by the jurisprudence of union is constitutionally sound.
For even if we could all agree that the relevant cases are (and ought to be)
about policing the construction of our political identity, we might still differ
on the question of what the Constitution has to say about how that identity is
constructed.  It is to that question that I now turn.
B. Union and Vertical Federalism: Evaluating the Doctrine
In this Section, I test the constitutional bona fides of the jurisprudence
of union.  In particular, I scrutinize the principles of federalism that appear
to motivate this body of jurisprudence in light of constitutional text and his-
tory, the functional values traditionally associated with federalism, constitu-
tional structure, and precedent.  We will see that text, history, and functional
analysis provide neither emphatic support for the jurisprudence of union nor
compelling reasons to doubt its soundness.  Considerations of constitutional
structure, on the other hand, are more telling: they tend to confirm that the
statutes under review in the Court’s union-oriented decisions advance a mis-
taken conception of our political identity.
As far as precedential analysis goes, the cases surveyed above178 tell
much of the relevant story.  In fact, it is appropriate to say that those cases
define our constitutional tradition when it comes to the value of union.  But
they do not tell all of the story; for, as we will see, two widely debated deci-
sions handed down by the Rehnquist Court—New York v. United States and
Printz v. United States—advance a conception of constitutional structure and
union that is quite different from the one embodied in the cases we have
examined thus far.  These cases complicate efforts to understand what our
Constitution has to tell us about union and the mutual obligations of the
federal government and the states.
1. Text and History
The text of the United States Constitution does not tell us, in so many
words, how far states may go when it comes to expressing disagreement with
national law.  Nor does it indicate, more generally, when a state’s refusal to
take ownership of things federal will fall on the wrong side of the line that
distinguishes tolerable entailments of state autonomy from intolerable exer-
cises in disunion.  It does not speak in terms of the balance between national
and state political identity, and it does not explicitly connect the specific
commands and prohibitions in the Constitution’s text to a particular concep-
tion of political self.  By any metric, the text of the Constitution is underspeci-
fied with respect to the questions that concern us here.
in favor of religious self-identifications”). See generally Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278
(2011) (describing the development of an “antibalkanization principle”—focused on the
interest in social cohesion and union—in the Court’s race equality cases).
178 See supra Parts I and II.
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Analysis of the historical record from the ratification era, along with that
of the early constitutional period, is scarcely more illuminating.  Although
historical analysis has become a staple of modern cases relating to the shape
of our federalism,179 the jurisprudence of union has developed without sus-
tained attention to historical materials.  Indeed, other than the Court’s reli-
ance on Federalist No. 82 in Howlett v. Rose,180 and a lengthy discourse in the
solo component of Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Haywood (which
altogether rejects the central tenets of the Court’s jurisprudence of
union),181 one sees nothing of this sort across the bodies of doctrine
examined in Parts I and II.182
A number of scholars have carefully mined the available historical evi-
dence (at least in connection with Congress’s power to compel state courts to
adjudicate federal claims), but their analyses point in different directions.
Thus, Professor Warren’s widely cited article Federal Criminal Law and the State
Courts—which offers a detailed account of the development of federal juris-
dictional law during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—
concludes that “[w]hile Congress has no power to force jurisdiction upon a
State Court, it has the power to leave jurisdiction to a State Court.”183  Profes-
sor Collins, meanwhile, agrees that the relevant historical record contains
“almost no suggestion” that Congress could require state courts to adjudicate
federal claims.184  But he goes even further and insists that, with respect to
significant chunks of federal business, there was a widespread understanding
that state courts were not even permitted to exercise jurisdiction.185  Professor
Prakash, finally, on the basis of his review of the ratification era history, deter-
mines that “the Founding Generation understood that state courts could be
commandeered to enforce federal law.”186  There is, it would seem, no con-
sensus as to what the historical evidence tells us about state courts’ powers
and duties with respect to the enforcement of federal law.  And without fur-
ther development in our understanding of the historical record—pertaining
to the issue of state judicial autonomy or to the issues ventilated in the other
cases examined earlier—this sort of analysis cannot provide real traction on
the question of what the union-based constraints on state autonomy ought to
look like.187
179 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–27 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 905–18 (1997).
180 See supra text accompanying notes 76–77. R
181 See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 743–56 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182 See supra Parts I and II.
183 Warren, supra note 170, at 546. R
184 Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 135.
185 Id. at 74.
186 Prakash, supra note 67, at 2032 (emphasis added). R
187 One conclusion that I think safely can be drawn from the available historical evi-
dence is that the conception of union that appears to drive the valid excuse cases was not
widely shared during the first half-century or more under the Constitution. Federalist No.
27 notwithstanding, see supra note 169 and accompanying text, members of the founding R
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2. The Functions of Federalism
Another way to assess whether the jurisprudence of union represents a
sound exercise in constitutional federalism is by considering the functional
values our federal system is traditionally thought to serve.  We might ask, for
example, whether the constraints on state autonomy announced in the case
law undermine the capacity of our federal system to deliver increased individ-
ual liberty, enhanced opportunities for political participation, or the tailor-
ing of policies to suit the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.188  If they
do, then there is reason to doubt whether these decisions fit comfortably into
our constitutional design.  To gain insight into these questions, I focus, once
again, on the valid excuse cases and on the limits on state autonomy to
decline jurisdiction over federal cause of action.
Take first the interest in protecting individual liberty.  As Alexander
Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 28, dividing power between the federal
government and the states is, among other things, a strategy for preventing
its abuse:
Power being almost always the rival of power; the General Government will
at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments;
and these will have the same disposition towards the General Government.
The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it
preponderate.  If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the
other, as the instrument of redress.189
There is little reason to think that requiring state courts to adjudicate federal
claims will impede states’ capacity to contribute to the preservation of liberty
generation apparently did not consider state court adjudication of federal claims to be a
union-reinforcing device (at least not in the sense of cultivating a widespread sense of
national political identity).  Instead, there is evidence that some who supported at least the
permissibility of state court adjudication of federal claims did so “out of a desire to allay
State jealousy and to reduce Federal power.”  Warren, supra note 170, at 581.  Others R
denied the existence of any such power on the theory that state court adjudication of
federal claims was inimical to national interests. See, e.g., id. at 561, 567.  Unsurprisingly,
the seeds of the valid excuse doctrine were planted shortly after the Civil War, see Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876), at which time the imperatives of union must have
looked quite different than they had during the early constitutional period. See, e.g., Testa
v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390 (1947) (noting that questions pertaining to state courts’ responsi-
bilities with respect to the enforcement of federal law were largely settled “after the funda-
mental issues over the extent of federal supremacy had been resolved by war”).
188 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (taking note of the values
traditionally associated with the establishment of federal systems).  There is a great deal of
scholarly debate on the question of whether federalism is either necessary or sufficient to
provide these benefits. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 168, at 7–38.  I will not engage that R
debate here.  Instead, I presume that federalism, generally speaking, is capable of advanc-
ing the values mentioned above and inquire whether and how its capacity to do so might
be affected by the jurisprudence of union.  The analysis in the ensuing paragraphs mirrors
(though it is less detailed than) Professor Caminker’s analysis of New York v. United States
and of the functional implications of the prohibition on congressional commandeering
announced in that case. See Caminker, supra note 45, at 1060–87. R
189 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
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in this way.  This is so for two reasons.  First, the substantive scope of federal
regulatory authority—the potential expansion of which represents, for pur-
poses of this analysis, perhaps the single most important threat to individual
liberty—is simply not at issue in this context.  The central question raised by
the valid excuse cases is how valid federal law is to be enforced, not whether
federal law is valid in the first place.  Second, the primary means through
which state governments and officials might help to check the expansion of
federal power—by “‘sound[ing] the alarm’ to alert the national electorate
and by mobilizing political forces against federal policies”190—are not under-
mined by federal legislation that compels state courts to adjudicate federal
claims.
A related worry is that by requiring state judges to devote their time and
energy to the adjudication of federal claims, federal commandeering of state
judiciaries will sap state governments of the independence and vitality neces-
sary for them to serve as alternate centers of political power capable of check-
ing the federal government.191  I do not think this concern is a serious one.
The question of whether people view state government as meaningfully inde-
pendent of the federal political process, and, as a corollary, whether they
view participation in state government as a worthwhile endeavor, would seem
to turn primarily on whether states enjoy a meaningful measure of regulatory
freedom and capacity.  It turns, in other words, on what state governments
get to do, all things considered.  And there is no mistaking the fact that, not-
withstanding the vast reach of federal power under modern conditions, state
and local governments continue to enjoy significant authority and exercise
wide discretion across many policy domains.  Certainly it is the case that, to
this point in our history, neither state courts’ routine adjudication of federal
claims as they arise in connection with state law causes of action, nor the
longstanding practice of (both voluntary and compelled) state court adjudi-
cation of federal claims, has created the perception that the work of the state
judiciaries is “superfluous to participation in the national political
process.”192
It is likewise difficult to see why compulsory state court adjudication of
federal claims would diminish opportunities for political participation in
local government.  Even assuming that a consequence of requiring state
courts to adjudicate federal claims is that state judges spend less of their time
on state law matters, there is no reason to think this represents a difference
in the quantity or quality of the participatory exercise.193  Indeed, requiring
190 See Caminker, supra note 45, at 1075 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) R
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Rossiter ed., 1961)).
191 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 10, at 1328. R
192 Id.; see also Caminker, supra note 45, at 1077 (“Congress’s decision to have state R
rather than federal officials implement a particular policy does not materially reduce the
universe of governing tasks left to state officials, and thus should not appreciably under-
mine the state’s character as an independent political culture.”).
193 If state judges generally had less discretion in cases involving federal law than in
cases involving state law, there might be reason to think that the measure of their participa-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 45 10-FEB-14 13:39
2014] the  jurisprudence  of  union 1129
state judges to adjudicate federal claims would seem to enhance opportuni-
ties for participation in governance; first, through simple diversification of
the substantive legal regimes state judges are called upon to enforce and,
second, by giving state judges a hand in the development of a body of law
that would otherwise fall exclusively to federal officials to enforce.194
It is also the case that constraining state courts’ authority to decline juris-
diction over federal causes of action should in no way affect states’ capacity to
produce substantive policy diversification and thereby increase the likelihood
of government serving the unique needs of different pockets of American
society.  It is crucial here, once again, that the legal doctrine in question does
not concern the scope of federal substantive lawmaking authority.  If Con-
gress is disabled from compelling state court participation in the adjudica-
tion of federal claims, it will neither increase the scope of state legislative
authority nor diminish the preemptive effect of federal law.  It will mean only
tion in the stuff of governance was contingent on the amount of federal law adjudication
they were called upon to perform.  But even allowing for differences in our constitutional
disposition toward the creation of federal common law and state common law, this seems a
dubious conclusion.  Statutory and constitutional interpretation often involve the exercise
of significant discretion.  And even when this discretion is relatively cabined, the adjudica-
tive process would still seem to provide significant opportunity for participation in
governance.
194 Cf. Caminker, supra note 45, at 1078 (noting that “when Congress uses bounded R
discretion mandates to leave state and local governments with substantial control over
important subsidiary policies, . . . Congress actually preserves a greater role for local politi-
cal participation than were it to preempt state regulation entirely”).  One might worry that
the participatory experience of state legislators or administrative officials—not state
judges—would be desiccated by virtue of congressional commandeering of state courts.
This would be the case if, absent authority to involve state judges in the process of enforc-
ing federal law, the law in question might not be enacted at all, thus leaving room for states
to regulate as they please.  The question of how seriously to take this concern turns on a
complex assessment of the likelihood that, faced with the possibility of one or more states
declining to adjudicate some set of federal claims, Congress would abandon the relevant
component of its regulatory effort.  The necessary analysis would then require weighing
the “participation costs” suffered by states when their judges do not have a hand in the
interpretation of federal law (when Congress goes ahead and enacts the law notwithstand-
ing the possibility that some states will opt out of enforcement) and the “participation
benefits” enjoyed by states when their legislative and executive officials enjoy the enhanced
regulatory freedom that accompanies a congressional decision not to regulate.  I do not
pretend to know precisely what results such an assessment would yield.  I am inclined to
think the set of circumstances in which the federal government would forego regulation
altogether if it could not rely on its authority to compel state courts to adjudicate federal
claims is rather small.  But if we imagine full-scale withdrawal by the states from the process
of adjudicating the claims associated with a particular federal law, and the potentially sig-
nificant costs to the federal government of requiring federal tribunals to shoulder the
entire load, then the possibility of regulatory abstention by the federal government seems
more plausible.
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that states participate less in the interpretation and development of such fed-
eral law as is enacted.195
Finally, in assessing the impact of compulsory state court adjudication of
federal claims on the functioning of our federal system, we might consider
the argument—advanced by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States
and Printz v. United States—that when Congress commandeers arms of state
government, it undermines the accountability of both state and federal offi-
cials.  The crux of the argument is that commandeering causes voter confu-
sion; in particular, it might cause voters mistakenly to blame the enforcing
government (the state) for the policies of the enacting government (the
feds).196
Others have exposed the significant weaknesses that inhere in this
accountability argument, and I will not rehearse the key moves here.197  It is
worth adding, however, that in the particular context of state court adjudica-
tion of federal claims, the likelihood of voter confusion on the question of
who bears responsibility for a particular law seems especially low.  This is
because of the deeply entrenched expectation (it is, perhaps, properly
regarded as a requirement) that judges give reasons for the decisions they
make.198  Hence, even if we indulged the dubious assumption that there is
cause to be concerned about official accountability when Congress comman-
deers arms of state government, the concern appears muted where state judi-
ciaries are concerned.  And on the whole, accountability concerns provide
little reason to doubt the constitutional bona fides of the jurisprudence of
union.
3. Structure
One might find support for the jurisprudence of union by reference to
considerations of constitutional structure, though it must be acknowledged
that the structural argument is a contingent one.  It is tempting to maintain
that it is simply a contradiction in terms to have a union in which member
states fail to take ownership of federal directives or somehow resist the notion
of their belonging to a political community that is national in scope.  But this
argument is overstated.  The label “union” can sensibly be applied to a wide
195 See supra note 194 and accompanying text; cf. Caminker, supra note 45, at 1079 R
(observing, for similar reasons, that federal commandeering of state legislatures “works no
greater, and perhaps a substantially smaller, direct intrusion on state autonomy in the reg-
ulated field than does conventional federal governance”).
196 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 169 (1992).
197 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 45, at 1061–74; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political R
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty”
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 824–31 (1998).
198 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 838 (1991) (“In our law . . . the exercise of a power to
speak authoritatively as an interpreter carries with it an obligation to explain the grounds
upon which the interpreter gives that authoritative judgment.”).
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variety of political federations exhibiting greater and lesser degrees of toler-
ance for expressions of separation by individual states or signals from those
states that membership in a local political community is somehow paramount
over membership in the national.199  The United States, certainly, would not
cease to be a union if states were permitted to provide tax benefits to state
and local employees while denying them to federal employees.  And I do not
think we would regard “union” as a misnomer for our structure of govern-
ment if state courts were given greater freedom to decline jurisdiction over
federal claims.  So it just won’t do to insist that, simply by virtue of establish-
ing a federal union, our Constitution prohibits states from enacting laws that
treat state, rather than national, political identity as primary.200
More promising is the argument that state laws that treat the federal
government or federal law as outsiders are out of step with the prevailing
constitutional order in the United States today.  Nobody doubts that our
national government enjoys extremely broad legislative authority.  Federal
law covers fields as diverse as employment, securities trading, and environ-
mental protection.  It touches the most intimate details of our lives, including
whom we can marry, how we care for our loved ones when they are ill, and
whether a woman must carry a pregnancy to term.  Our practice of looking to
the national government to address our most pressing (and, sometimes, our
most personal) challenges—a practice that has been reinforced and acceler-
ated over the course of generations—signals an extraordinarily high measure
of citizen identification with the national government.201  Seen in this light,
the difficulty with state statutes that rest on a thin conception of citizens’
kinship with the federal government is not so much that they are misguided
or dangerous as that they trade in a notion that simply isn’t true.202
199 The term “union” is attached to political systems as diverse at the United States,
United Kingdom, European Union, United Nations, United Arab Emirates, United Mexi-
can States, United Arab Republic, and so on. See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism
and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION 213, 213–51 (Kalypso Nicolaidis &
Robert Howse eds., 2001) (exploring variance in the law of different federal systems—
specifically, the United States, Germany, and the European Union—with respect to the
question of whether the central government is permitted to commandeer subnational gov-
ernment units).
200 Cf. Metzger, supra note 4, at 1503 (noting, in the course of examining the implica- R
tions of union for a variety of doctrines in the law of horizontal federalism, that “[v]iewed
functionally, the demands of national union have little preset, acontextual content”).
201 See Caminker, supra note 153, at 88–89 (noting that “over the course of two centu- R
ries, we have become a unified nation with primarily national rather than state affiliations
and loyalties” and explaining that we “perceive ourselves as national citizens first and state
citizens second (if much at all)”); see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 168, at 115 (“[T]he R
American people . . . have a unified political identity.”).
202 Professor Manning has argued that “it is . . . difficult to infer particular restrictions
on state power from the broad proposition that we are a nation.”  John F. Manning, Federal-
ism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2068
n.286 (2009).  This is a fair point.  A full-throated defense of structural inference as an
interpretive method (in federalism cases or otherwise) is beyond the scope of this Article.
For present purposes, however, I wish to note, first, that the structural account offered
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To be sure, there are those who object to the extent of federal power.
Vigorous opposition to the scope of federal authority, and to the pervasive-
ness of federal regulation, is not only a familiar feature of the academic liter-
ature pertaining to federalism,203 it is a highly salient feature of modern
political discourse as well.204  But this is, at the end of the day, a rearguard
action.  And, perhaps more importantly, it is one that few seem serious about
in its more aggressive forms.  This is to say that (a) the likelihood of a truly
significant retrenchment in the scope and nature of federal regulatory power
is vanishingly small; and (b) for all the rhetoric in the political and judicial
sphere about the need to rein in the authority of the national government,
one is hard pressed to find those who would curtail federal authority in ways
sufficiently dramatic as to shift us off the course outlined immediately
above.205  If the law is to “conform with and reflect the nation’s political
identity,”206 then, it must take heed of these powerful signals that that iden-
tity is primarily national in character.
I don’t want to overstate the point.  One can imagine a multitude of
arguments that begin with the notion that the federal government is pos-
here is the best tool for making sense of the diverse body of cases examined in Parts I and
II.  One of the significant casualties of Manning’s constitutional textualism is our ability to
make sense of large swaths of constitutional law. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional
Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 98, 103 (2009) (taking note of the
“destabilizing implications” of Manning’s approach toward constitutional interpretation).
The union-oriented decisions highlighted here would simply add to the body count.  Sec-
ond, it is worth considering (in light of the Preamble) whether union in fact counts as a
value that is “attached to no particular clause of the document,” or, instead, whether we
should regard the union-driving components of the Constitution (including the Preamble)
as fragments of the text that are not “precisely drawn” and “leave room for interpretation.”
Manning, supra, at 2008, 2068.
203 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1454 (1987).
204 See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, G.O.P. Anti-Federalism Aims at Education, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2011, at A28 (noting that “the quest to sharply shrink government that all the Republican
candidates [in the presidential election of 2012] embrace . . . has brought a sweeping anti-
federalism to the fore on education, as in many other areas”).
205 See, e.g., Andrew C. McCarthy, Big-Government Republicans, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb.
2, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/289905/big-government-
republicans-andrew-c-mccarthy (“The brute fact is that today’s Republican establishment
does not believe in limited government.  ‘Limited government’ is a slogan reserved for
campaigns and fund-raising drives.  The idea is not to rein in big government; it’s to hold
the reins of big government.”).
Even among the conservative Justices who have shown a willingness to reinvigorate
limits on the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, only Justice Thomas
has shown the slightest hint of enthusiasm for returning to an original understanding of
that Clause which, by Justice Thomas’s lights at least, would require jettisoning Congress’s
power to regulate activity on the ground that it substantially affects interstate commerce.
See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
206 Caminker, supra note 153, at 85. R
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sessed of enormous power and end with the conclusion that some state enact-
ment (with ramifications for federal law or the federal government) cannot
be reconciled with our constitutional structure.  Things cannot always be so
simple.  But for purposes of the particular inquiry pursued here, the scope of
federal authority within our modern constitutional order seems genuinely
probative.  The nature of our political identity—and, as a corollary, the ques-
tion of whether a state statute expresses the right view of that identity—is
partially contingent on the role different levels of government play in our
lives.  It is contingent, in other words, on the role that we, by virtue of our
evolving social and legal traditions, permit (and sometimes demand) those
different levels of government to play in our lives.  It seems fair to say, then,
that the fact of our federal government’s broad authority and pervasive activ-
ity sheds light on the question of whether the jurisprudence of union rests on
a sound conception of our constitutional structure.
4. Precedent: The Anti-Commandeering Decisions and the Jurisprudence
of Union
In assessing the merits of a claim about constitutional meaning, it is con-
ventional to inquire as to the quality of the claim’s fit with our precedential
traditions.  In this case, the decisions surveyed already (in Parts I and II)
constitute the core of the relevant tradition.  Collectively, these decisions
establish a firm foundation for the imposition, in vertical federalism cases, of
union-based constraints on state autonomy.  But there are Supreme Court
decisions that sound a different note with respect to the obligations of mem-
bership in our union.  In particular, the Court’s anti-commandeering cases—
New York v. United States and Printz v. United States—rest on a conception of
union that is markedly different from the one we have encountered thus far.
New York and Printz, respectively, hold that Congress may neither com-
pel state legislatures to enact federal regulatory programs nor require state
executive officials to enforce federal law.207  Such exercises of federal author-
ity, the Court held, impermissibly “commandeer” arms of state government
and press them into federal service.208  The tension between these decisions
and the valid excuse cases—which, we have seen, affirm congressional
authority to compel state courts to enforce federal law—is not news.  Indeed,
the Court took pains in New York and Printz to distinguish the holding in
Testa v. Katt,209 and the dissenting Justices in Printz emphasized the difficulty
of doing so.210  But it is only when we come to see Testa as part of a larger
body of cases reinforcing a particular conception of our union that we get a
clear picture of how difficult it is to fit New York and Printz into the body of
case law that preceded those decisions.
207 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
208 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
209 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29; New York, 505 U.S. at 178–79.
210 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 967 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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To see this, it is useful to contrast our discussion of the expressivist con-
siderations that seem to motivate the jurisprudence of union with expressivist
accounts of the anti-commandeering doctrine.  Professor Cox, for example,
has argued that New York and Printz are driven by the intuition that “com-
mandeering of states—more so than other mechanisms of federal control of
state regulatory capacities—expresses denigration for state autonomy.”211
Cox finds support for this claim in the rhetoric deployed by the Printz major-
ity, including the Court’s observations “that commandeering ‘reduc[es] [the
states] to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress’ and ‘dragoon[s]’ state offi-
cials.”212  Along these same lines, Professors Anderson and Pildes emphasize
that New York and Printz trade in the “language of degradation, subordina-
tion, and domination.”213  And they argue, further, that the anti-comman-
deering cases signal that “[t]he political relationships constituted by and
expressed through national legislation that simply orders state officials to
become vehicles of Congress [are] . . . inconsistent with the structural rela-
tionships that the Constitution establishes.”214
But, of course, the vision of state participation in the enforcement of
federal law that these commentators find implicit in the anti-commandeering
decisions is nothing like the one that quietly informs cases like Testa and
Haywood.215  In those cases, we have seen, state courts’ role in the enforce-
ment of federal law is depicted not as an exercise in degradation and subor-
dination, but as an expression of union and ownership, association and
responsibility.
It could be argued, perhaps, that from the perspective of union, com-
mandeering state legislatures, at least, is different from commandeering state
courts.  If states’ central obligation under the valid excuse cases is to treat
federal law and policy as their own,216 then it would seem to matter whether
the federal government has actually enacted law that specifies the content of
federal policy or, instead, has left a regulatory void and demanded that that
void be filled by law and policy of the states’ design.  The obligation of union,
the argument goes, requires states to adopt a particular attitude toward
existing federal law and policy, but it does not require them to establish that
law and policy themselves.217
211 Cox, supra note 10, at 1330. R
212 Id. at 1331–32 (alterations in original) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 928).
213 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 1559. R
214 Id.
215 See supra notes 18–80 and accompanying text. R
216 See supra text accompanying notes 64–66. R
217 The federal government advanced a version of this argument in the brief submitted
to the Supreme Court in Printz, though of course the interest in union did not make an
appearance. See Brief for the United States at 10, Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (Nos. 95-1478, 95-
1503), 1996 WL 595005, at *10 (emphasizing that the law under review “d[id] not require
the States to add anything in the way of policy to those choices made by the federal govern-
ment, or otherwise to devise a solution to the problem [addressed by federal law]”); see also
id. at 10–11 (noting that “[i]n the statute under review in New York, Congress identified a
national problem . . . but failed to enact a federal solution”).
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But this distinction has no more than surface appeal.  Nothing inherent
in the concept of union suggests that states should be exempt from the obli-
gation to internalize federal policy simply because that policy is underspeci-
fied.  The central lesson of the valid excuse cases—and the jurisprudence of
union more generally—is that states must respect their citizens’ identities as
members of a national political community.  When the national law that
binds those citizens (and is of those citizens) declares a policy in favor of
states devising solutions to a federally identified problem, it is difficult to see
why states’ duty of respect ought to be any different from the one that kicks
in when national law not only identifies a problem but mandates a particular
solution to it.  At least, nothing about the value of union itself suggests any
such distinction.
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Printz takes a stab at explaining
why the commandeering of state judiciaries is permitted under the Testa line
of cases, while the commandeering of other branches of state government is
constitutionally prohibited.  “It is understandable,” Justice Scalia wrote,
“[that] courts should have been viewed distinctively in this regard; unlike
state legislatures and executives, they appl[y] the law of other sovereigns all
the time.”218  But this contention turns the reasoning of Testa on its head.  It
imagines that case to be rooted not in the uniqueness of states’ relationship
to federal law and the federal government, but in the polar opposite
notion—that states’ obligations with respect to federal law represent a varia-
tion on the traditions governing states’ interface with the laws of foreign
nations.  Yet Testa provides explicitly (and, indeed, seems to rest its conclu-
sion on the notion) that “state courts do not bear the same relation to the United
States that they do to foreign countries.”219
The point is worth lingering over for a moment because it sheds bright
light on the conception of union that lies at the heart of the valid excuse
decisions.  One can imagine the Testa Court having justified its conclusion—
that state courts of competent jurisdiction cannot decline to hear federal
causes of action—on the ground suggested by Justice Scalia—namely that
state courts routinely tackle whatever business comes over the transom, and
so it is no affront to the autonomy of the states for Congress to add federal
causes of action to the mix.  But the Court did no such thing.  Instead, it
flatly rejected the state court’s assumption “that it has no more obligation to
enforce a valid penal law of the United States than it has to enforce a penal
law of another state or a foreign country.”220  That assumption, we have seen,
“flies in the face of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a
nation.”221  Hence, the Printz majority managed to distinguish Testa only by
218 Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
219 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947) (emphasis added).
220 Id.
221 Id.
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ignoring what it says and by disregarding the conception of union on which
that decision is premised.222
The dissenting Justices in Printz scarcely did better along this dimension.
Thus, Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion joins issue with the majority on the
question of whether the anti-commandeering decisions can be reconciled
with Testa,223 but it does not focus attention on the conflicting visions of
union underlying the cases.224  Indeed, for the most part, the dissenting
opinion eschews talk of underlying constitutional values and grounds its anal-
ysis in text and history.225  If anything, the dissent implies that the cardinal
value at stake when Congress seeks to compel state government to take a
hand in the implementation of federal law is the value of supremacy, and it
suggests that the central interest at stake is the interest in allowing Congress
to implement federal policy in the manner it deems most efficacious.226
The Court’s failure, in its union-oriented decisions, to give sustained
attention to the constitutional values at stake thus came home to roost in the
anti-commandeering decisions.  Faced with a set of questions about the
extent of states’ obligation to take ownership of federal law and policy, the
Justices largely neglected the diverse body of decisional law through which
222 The New York and Printz Courts both attempted to distinguish Testa on the ground
that the Supremacy Clause, through its explicit reference to state judges (and failure to
refer explicitly to state executive officers and legislators), calls for different treatment of
the branches of state government for commandeering purposes. See Printz, 521 U.S. at
928–29 & n.14; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178–79 (1992).  For reasons per-
suasively laid out by Professor Caminker, this argument fails to persuade. See Caminker,
supra note 45, at 1034–42; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 968 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) R
(explaining that the Judges Clause establishes a choice of law rule to govern state court
adjudication in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the state courts but does not supply
independent authority for commandeering state judges).
223 Printz, 521 U.S. at 967–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224 The dissenters did rely heavily on Testa to defend the claim that “not only the Con-
stitution, but every law enacted by Congress as well, establishes policy for the States just as
firmly as do laws enacted by state legislatures.” Id. at 944; see also id. (quoting at length
from Testa, including the well-known passages providing that federal legislation “estab-
lishe[s] a policy for all” and “is as much the policy of [the State] as if [the law] had ema-
nated from its own legislature”).  As noted earlier, this conception of states’ relationship to
federal law is best understood as an obligation that inheres in union. See supra text accom-
panying notes 64–66, 68–74.  But the dissenters in Printz were content simply to identify, R
rather than explain, these features of our federalism, and their subsequent analysis sug-
gests that they tended to view the problem in supremacy-based terms. See infra note 226 R
and accompanying text.
225 In particular, the dissenters argued that the regulation at issue in Printz fell within
the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and that there is no sup-
port in the text of the Constitution for the anti-commandeering rule announced by the
Court. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 941–44 (Stevens., J., dissenting).
226 This is reflected most prominently in the final passage of the dissenting opinion,
which states: “If Congress believes that . . . a statute will benefit the people of the Nation,
and serve the interests of cooperative federalism better than an enlarged federal bureau-
cracy, we should respect both its policy judgment and its appraisal of its constitutional
power.” Id. at 970.
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the Court has been grappling with these questions—in assorted variations—
for decades.  And to the extent the Court did engage with these precedents,
it failed to grasp their import.  This is not to say that the anti-commandeering
cases would have been decided differently if only the Court’s earlier deci-
sions had been clearer about union’s role in underwriting constraints on
state autonomy.  But it might have enabled the Justices to have a more illumi-
nating conversation about when and why states ought to be required to take a
hand in the development and implementation of federal law and policy.
Instead, we are left with a pair of decisions that fit poorly into a longstanding
constitutional tradition and seem barely conscious of it.
C. Union and Vertical Federalism: Further Applications
In this Section, I take up the question of whether and how the jurispru-
dence of union might apply in two scenarios not yet addressed by the courts.
Both involve state laws that express disagreement with federal law and policy
and thus appear to transgress the limits articulated in the Court’s jurispru-
dence of union.  Yet application of the principles examined in this Article to
these scenarios is far from straightforward.
Consider, first, the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.  It reads:
[T]he General Assembly finds and declares that [the] longstanding policy of
this State to protect the right to life of the unborn child from conception by
prohibiting abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother is
impermissible only because of the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and that, therefore, if those decisions of the United States Supreme
Court are ever reversed or modified or the United States Constitution is
amended to allow protection of the unborn then the former policy of this
State to prohibit abortions unless necessary for the preservation of the
mother’s life shall be reinstated.227
Louisiana enacted a similar statute in 1981.228  These provisions unabashedly
distance the enacting states from the policy embodied in federal law.  And
because neither statute calls for the actual implementation of state policy
pertaining to abortion, it seems safe to say that they are designed simply to
express the enacting states’ disagreement with federal law and policy.229
At first blush, this sort of thing seems straightforwardly impermissible,
since the jurisprudence of union—the doctrine of valid excuse, in particu-
lar—signals that states cannot use their law to express disagreement with fed-
eral policy.230  On reflection, however, there is reason to think that statutes
227 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 510/1 (West 2013).
228 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (2012).
229 These statutes might serve the additional purpose of spring-loading state policy
relating to abortion so that, in the event of a change in federal constitutional law, state
policy can be implemented without the need for additional legislative action.
230 I leave to one side the question of whether a state law of this sort (i.e., one that
explicitly orders the non-implementation of the policy it embodies) is subject to judicial
review.  As other commentators have noted, cases involving allegations of expressive harm
tend to confound conventional standing analysis. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
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like these are constitutionally unproblematic.  When a state uses its law as a
means of expressing opposition to federal policy, but announces in the very
same breath that it will continue to adhere to the federal norm, it expresses
commitment to the national political community and, indeed, highlights its
willingness to incur costs to make good on that commitment.  In this way, the
Illinois Abortion Law and its Louisiana counterpart, far from downplaying
the significance of national political identity, highlight the potency of that
identity.
To see the difference between the expressive content of statutes like the
Illinois and Louisiana abortion laws and the expressive content of statutes
that run afoul of the union-based limits on state autonomy, consider the fol-
lowing example: Say my family is having guests over for dinner, and I ask my
children to help clean the house in preparation for the guests’ arrival.  Son
#1 is outraged (obviously).  He (loudly) expresses his lack of regard for the
“let’s clean up” initiative and, although he pitches in and cleans his room,
protests vigorously all the while.  Son #2 is equally outraged (equally obvi-
ously), but he adopts a different strategy: he sits around and does nothing,
leaving the rest of the family to clean without his help.  Quite obviously, there
is reason to object to Son #2’s behavior if he makes it impossible for us to
clean the house in time.  He will thereby have undermined the family’s cho-
sen objective.231  But even if that’s not the case—even if we can (and do) get
the job done easily without his help—there is reason to think differently
about the two boys’ behavior, for they send different messages about what it
means to be a member of our family.
Son #1 communicates that membership in our family comes with
responsibilities attached, and that we help each other out, even if it means
doing something we find burdensome or unpleasant.  Son #2 acts on a thin-
ner conception of what membership in our family entails.  He seems to think
his responsibilities extend only so far as he approves of whatever the family
happens to be doing.  I’d be justified in insisting that Son #2 lend a hand,
even if his contribution to the cleaning effort is not strictly necessary and
even if the additional burden faced by other family members as a result of his
non-participation is trivial.  Such insistence would help constitute my family
as a community in which pitching in is the norm.
Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276,
2285–91 (1998); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 158, at 513–16.  Within the universe of such R
cases, moreover, one involving a provision like the Illinois Abortion Law—which says some-
thing (“we oppose federal policy pertaining to abortion”) but doesn’t do anything—would
appear to present a particularly weak case for Article III standing.  In cases from the Testa/
Haywood line, the relevant states express something by doing something (i.e., carving cases
out of the jurisdiction of state courts).  But the abortion statutes examined here do not
communicate a message through the implementation of some policy; they communicate a
message simply by saying something.  Even one who is willing to recognize legally cogniza-
ble harm in the former sort of case might balk at doing so in the latter scenario.
231 We will pretend, for purposes of this discussion, that “the family’s objective,” in my
house, is determined by the parents.
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The abortion statutes mentioned above look more like the behavior of
Son #1 than that of Son #2.  They express disagreement with federal policy,
but they don’t act on that disagreement.  On the other hand, the state courts
that dismiss federal claims on grounds of disagreement with federal policy
seem more like Son #2, who refuses to pitch in and help clean the house. We
are justified, in that scenario, in insisting that the state lend a hand, even if its
adjudication of the relevant federal claims is not strictly necessary to the
advancement of federal policy (which is to say, even if state jurisdictional law
poses no real threat to federal supremacy).  Such insistence helps constitute
our union as one in which states identify with the national government and
federal law.
Next, consider provisions like the marijuana decriminalization initiatives
passed in Colorado and Washington in 2012.232  It is possible that these mea-
sures (and the regulatory schemes they’ve spawned) are preempted outright
by federal law.233  After all, they attempt to regulate (to make regular) that
which federal law prohibits.  But what I’d like to focus on is the distinct ques-
tion whether Colorado and Washington have run afoul of the union-based
constraints on state autonomy.  For the measures in question not only
express the enacting states’ disagreement with federal drug policy, they act
on that disagreement by repealing state-level criminal penalties for the cov-
ered conduct and calling for the establishment of regulatory infrastructure to
govern behavior that federal law forbids.  Thus, we are (at least) one step
removed from the abortion laws mentioned above, since the abortion provi-
sions do nothing more than formally express states’ disagreement with fed-
eral law and policy.
I think this is a difficult case.  On the one hand, no one thinks states are
obligated to replicate in their statute books the prohibitions codified in fed-
eral law.  So if we imagine a time at which neither the states nor the federal
government has any anti-drug laws, and imagine further that the federal gov-
ernment changes its policy and establishes criminal prohibitions on the pos-
session and use of marijuana, no one would argue that states would
immediately be obligated to enact parallel prohibitions under state criminal
law.  And even if some state declined, under these conditions, to criminalize
marijuana possession because it disagreed with the policy embodied in fed-
eral law, no one would think it cause for constitutional concern.  Our legal
tradition simply provides no support for the notion that the existence of a
gap between the content of state and federal criminal law is, without more,
constitutionally problematic.
On the other hand, the Colorado and Washington marijuana initiatives
seem quite different from a state’s refusal to take affirmative steps to repli-
cate criminal prohibitions established by federal law.  These repeals come in
232 See COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16; 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 3. (I.M. 502) (West).
233 For preliminary speculation on this issue, see the exchange between Professors Dorf
and Lederman. See Mike Dorf, Don’t Break Out the Cheetos and Goldfish at All (Not Even the
Vegan Alternatives), DORF ON LAW (Nov. 19, 2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/
2012/11/dont-break-out-cheetos-and-goldfish-at.html.
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the midst of highly salient public debate as to the wisdom of the criminal
prohibitions in question.  Moreover, there is a longstanding tradition of fed-
eral-state collaboration in the enforcement of this particular federal policy,
and there can be no doubt that states’ withdrawal from the field (coupled
with resource constraints that limit what the federal government can do on
its own along this dimension) will render enforcement of the policy codified
in our federal drug laws a de facto impossibility.234  There is, in short, no
escaping the fact that the decriminalization efforts in Colorado and Washing-
ton constitute a sharp rebuke of federal drug policy, and it cannot be denied
that the state laws in question will affect the real-world implementation of
that policy.  Given the emphasis, in the Court’s jurisprudence of union, on
states’ obligation to take ownership of federal law and policy, there is cause
to doubt the constitutionality of these measures.
That said, there are also reasons to think the Colorado and Washington
initiatives are salvageable.  To begin with, the expressive content of the Colo-
rado and Washington measures seems different from the expressive content
of the state action deemed impermissible in the union-oriented decisions
examined in Parts I and II.  Again, an example from the domestic sphere can
help to illustrate the point.  Imagine now that one of my kids (let’s call him
“the Unicorn”) has long been in the habit of helping clean the house when
he sees one of his parents doing so.  And imagine further that my family will
be hosting guests one evening, but I haven’t asked my kids to clean up in
anticipation of their arrival.  The Unicorn, let us assume, has grown weary of
the thoughtfulness and decency that characterized his earlier behavior, and
he sits idly by and watches as the rest of the family tidies up.  To be sure, the
shift in behavior is lamentable, and it hardly seems consistent with a thick
conception of responsibility to the community that is our family.  But it dif-
fers from the behavior of Son #2 in our prior example, which, you will recall,
entailed outright refusal to help in the face of a direct request.235  Perhaps
234 See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MARIJUANA LAWS 1 (2011), available
at http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/State-by-State-Laws-Report-2011.pdf (noting
that “99% of all marijuana arrests in the nation are made by state and local (not federal)
officials”).
235 Whether it makes sense to regard the federal government as having asked the states
for help with the enforcement of federal anti-drug law is by no means a simple question.
Much of the activity that has been decriminalized in Washington and Colorado—low quan-
tity possession and use—is formally prohibited by federal law, but has never been a signifi-
cant priority for federal law enforcement officials.  So, on the one hand, one might
conclude that the states’ change of heart along this dimension is perfectly consistent with
federal policy, as expressed through longstanding federal enforcement practice.  On the
other hand, we might say that federal policy is very much in favor of the arrest and prosecu-
tion of small-time marijuana users and that the federal government has long tacitly relied
on states to provide the enforcement muscle necessary to effectuate this policy.  To the
extent the latter formulation is sound, the changes in Colorado and Washington law look
more like disclaiming responsibility for federal law and refusing to lend a hand when the
federal government has asked for help.  I do not think there is a right answer to the ques-
tion of which of these accounts of states’ role in the enforcement of federal drug policy is
sound.  For purposes of the analysis here, however, I want to emphasize that the federal
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the union-based constraints on state autonomy should encompass behavior
that looks like that of Son #2, but not behavior that resembles the passive-
aggressive conduct exhibited by the Unicorn and, arguably, Colorado and
Washington.
More fundamentally, we might push back on the central premise of this
inquiry—that the Colorado and Washington initiatives actually defy federal
policy.  It is clear that the initiatives are out of step with federal law on the
books, but it is at least arguable that they reflect (and are helping to acceler-
ate) a shift in national attitudes toward the criminalization of marijuana use.
This raises the intriguing possibility that, in some instances, federal law does
not accurately capture “the union’s” stance toward a particular issue.
It is noteworthy, in this vein, that the Department of Justice recently
issued a Guidance Memorandum in which it explained that “the Department
of Justice has not historically devoted resources to prosecuting individuals
whose conduct is limited to possession of small amounts of marijuana for
personal use on private property,” and that it “has left such lower-level or
localized activity to state and local authorities.”236  The Memorandum speci-
fies, moreover, that notwithstanding the changes in Colorado and Washing-
ton, “enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and
regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-
related activity.”237  And the Department of Justice has informed the Gover-
nors of both Colorado and Washington that “it is deferring its right to chal-
lenge their legalization laws.”238  Thus, it may be too hasty to dismiss the
Colorado and Washington initiatives as exercises in dissociation from
national drug policy; they might be regarded, instead, as signals that this pol-
icy is changing.  At the very least, to the extent it was thought that federal
drug policy required sustained enforcement (by either state or federal offi-
cials) of criminal prohibitions against small-time marijuana possession and
use, the Department’s response to the Colorado and Washington initiatives
indicates otherwise.
Parallel questions arise when states enact laws that run counter to
existing Supreme Court doctrine and then (departing from the Illinois/Lou-
isiana model discussed above) go ahead and enforce the state policy in the
face of established doctrine to the contrary.  In some of these cases, the rele-
vant state officials enact and enforce state policy with the goal of stimulating
government has not formally reached out to the states for enforcement in the same way it
did in the circumstances presented in Printz.  This makes it plausible to classify the expres-
sive significance of states’ withdrawal from the enforcement of criminal prohibitions on
small-time marijuana use differently from the expressive significance of states’ refusal to
perform the background checks required under the federal law at issue in Printz.
236 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. James M. Cole to All U.S. Attorneys, Gui-
dance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 2 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
237 Id. at 3.
238 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Announces
Update to Marijuana Enforcement Policy (Aug. 29, 2013), www.justice/gov/opa/pr/2013/
August/13-opa-974.html.
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legal challenges and with the hope and belief that the prevailing understand-
ing of pertinent constitutional norms either has changed or is on the brink
of change.  Is this sort of constitutional reclamation project an affront to
union because it takes as its premise a view of our Constitution that is differ-
ent from that embodied in existing legal doctrine?  I would argue that it
depends on whether the relevant state officials are acting in good faith.
Good faith efforts by government officials to anticipate and even accelerate
plausible changes in constitutional norms might prove to violate the princi-
ple of supremacy (should the courts ultimately decline the invitation to mod-
ify existing law), but they need not be regarded as an affront to the value of
union since the relevant state actors purport to be advancing constitutional
norms (properly understood) rather than flouting them.  Of course, it is easy
to imagine state officials advancing implausible claims about the shape of our
constitutional law and attempting to pass them off as the stuff of “true” con-
stitutional understanding.  (It is likewise easy to imagine a state official insist-
ing that some exercise in dissociation from national policy in fact reflects a
considered judgment about the future trajectory of that policy.)239  But this
is a problem of implementation, and not a deficit in the underlying theoreti-
cal claim about when official state defiance of established law counts as an
affront to union.240
CONCLUSION
In the pantheon of constitutional values pertaining to American federal-
ism, national supremacy takes up a great deal of space.  We have seen that,
when federal law or national interests appear to be threatened by state
action, courts and commentators turn to this value almost reflexively, and
239 Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1273 (2009) (taking note of the problem “familiar to scholars of civil disobedi-
ence [of] . . . distinguishing between the scofflaw and the civil disobedient”).
240 Although they are cagey about endorsing outright the notion that it is generally
worthwhile to facilitate state dissent from federal policy, Professors Bulman-Pozen and Ger-
ken have highlighted some of the virtues of constitutional doctrines and administrative
schemes that are conducive to such dissent. See id. at 1260, 1284–1307, 1310.  Of particular
relevance to the discussion immediately above, they note state officials’ capacity to chal-
lenge and perhaps reshape national policy by “appeal[ing] to the nation’s shared laws and
traditions” as the best justification for some state action, as opposed to justifying that action
strictly by reference to state or local policy. Id. at 1289.  This observation (like much of the
analysis in their article) calls attention to the difficulty of distinguishing constitutionally
tolerable efforts to coax federal policy in new directions from constitutionally problematic
exercises in disunion.  It seems safe to say, despite the authors’ appropriately cautious dis-
claimer of a one-size-fits-all approach to the normative questions raised by their observa-
tions about state dissent, that they are more sanguine about this sort of state action than I
am.  For the most part, they shy away from the question of whether different species of
state dissent from federal policy constitute an affront to federal supremacy (the notable
exception is their treatment of preemption doctrine, which, they argue, should be more
accommodating of conflict between state and federal law) and do not address the conse-
quences of such dissent for the constitutional value of union at all.  Id. at 1304.
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they do so even when considerations of federal supremacy do not quite cap-
ture what’s at stake.  This has the effect of obscuring the role played by union
in defining the contours of the relationship between the federal government
and the states.  I have focused my attention here on the body of decisions
pertaining to state court duties to adjudicate federal claims, but we have seen
that in other contexts, too, it is union—and not supremacy—that best
explains the constitutional constraints on state authority.
Once we acknowledge that the interest in union drives these diverse
bodies of case law, important features of our constitutional law—features that
have gone largely unappreciated—come into focus.  First, we can see that the
value of union, already widely recognized as an important driver of doctrine
in horizontal federalism cases, has application to vertical federalism cases as
well.  Second, we can see that expressive considerations play a more promi-
nent role in the law of federalism than is generally understood.  The cases
explored here constitute a new data set supporting the intuition that it makes
sense to understand federalism doctrine (some of it, at least) in expressivist
terms.  They signal, moreover, that it is not only the federal government that
is subject to constraints on what it expresses about our federal system (a
claim that some scholars have advanced already)—the states are constrained
in this way as well.
I am not of the view that increased sensitivity to the constitutional inter-
est in union will change the fundamental dynamics of constitutional analysis
in federalism cases.  We will continue to operate in a space in which the text
of the Constitution provides limited guidance and in which the lessons that
can be gleaned from the historical record of the founding and the early con-
stitutional period are hotly contested.  Disputed background assumptions
about constitutional history and structure will shape our thinking about the
contours of the union-based constraints on state authority just as these
assumptions drive our intuitions about federalism when we deploy a
supremacy-based analytic frame.241  But even if these features of our thinking
about federalism remain unchanged, closer attention to the value of union
will afford us a clearer picture of why certain species of state action present
challenges from the perspective of constitutional structure.  Instead of talk-
ing past one another about federal supremacy, we might have an intelligible
conversation about the entailments of political union.
241 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141,
1228–29 (1988).
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